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JUSTICE STEVENS, THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE, AND THE JURY
Nancy S. Marder*
INTRODUCTION

This Symposium devoted to the Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens
provides an ideal opportunity to examine the dual aspirations that shape
Justice John Paul Stevens's jurisprudence with respect to the peremptory
challenge. His opinions reveal both a commitment to preserving the
peremptory challenge and a commitment to eliminating discrimination
during jury selection. One question is whether both of these commitments
can be maintained.
The framework that the U.S. Supreme Court developed in Batson v.
Kentucky1 embodies both of Justice Stevens's commitments. The Batson
framework preserves the peremptory challenge and tries to eliminate
discrimination based on race during jury selection. In a line of cases that I
will refer to as the Batson progeny, 2 the Court expanded the scope of
Batson. Batson and its progeny now prohibit peremptories based on race,
ethnicity, and gender, whether the discrimination is engaged in by the
prosecutor or the defense attorney, and whether exercised in a criminal or a
civil case.
In Batson and its progeny, the Court expressed its commitment to
nondiscrimination during jury selection, but its commitment has not been
unwavering. At times, the Court has appeared to lose its way. A brief per
curiam opinion in Purkett v. Elem3 undercut much of the strength and logic

* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I want to thank Justice John Paul
Stevens for giving me the opportunity to serve as his law clerk during the 1990-1992 Terms
of the U.S. Supreme Court. The clerkship was an extraordinary experience and Justice
Stevens was a wonderful teacher. I was particularly fortunate that during those two Terms
the Supreme Court decided a number of peremptory challenge cases. I also want to thank
Professor Abner Greene for organizing this long overdue conference devoted to the
Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens.
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that gender-based
peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (extending Batson to defense attorneys);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that race-based
peremptory challenges exercised in a civil case violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that a Batson
challenge can be made regardless of the defendant's race or ethnicity).
3. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
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of Batson, and Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, pointed out the ways in
which it did so. 4 Johnson v. California,5 a recent Court opinion that Justice
Stevens wrote for the majority, suggests that the Court has regained its
footing under Justice Stevens's watchful eye. As long as Batson remains on
the books it must retain its integrity, and Justice Stevens has assumed the
role of watchdog.
On the twentieth anniversary of Batson, however, it seems appropriate to
reconsider whether the Court's approach can truly rid jury selection of
discrimination. Batson was a compromise. 6 At the time many worried that
Batson sounded the death knell for the peremptory challenge. Although
peremptory challenges still exist, this Article considers whether Batson
actually eliminated discrimination during jury selection. Relatedly, what do
we have to show for twenty years of Batson? What have we lost and what
have we gained?
This Article will explore whether Justice Stevens's dual commitments to
preserving the peremptory challenge and to eliminating discrimination in
jury selection can and should be maintained. If not, what should the next
step be? My own view is that the peremptory challenge should be
eliminated. If Justice Stevens were to take this step, doing so would be
consistent with a broad view of the jury and its several roles, a view which
Justice Stevens has supported in his opinions and other writings.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explores Justice Stevens's
commitment to maintaining the peremptory challenge. Part II examines his
watchdog role in maintaining the integrity of Batson. Part III revisits
Batson and the trade-offs it has entailed. Part IV suggests the next stepthe elimination of the peremptory and how it would further other values that
Justice Stevens has expressed, such as respect for lower court judges.
Finally, Part V considers how the elimination of peremptories would
enhance many of the key roles that the jury plays and that Justice Stevens
has long protected.
I. A COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Justice Stevens's commitment to preserving the peremptory challenge
reflects both a lawyer's respect for maintaining a useful litigation tool and a
judge's regard for preserving legal traditions.

4. See id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5. 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005).
6. Batson, 476 U.S. at 126-27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (describing the Court's Batson
framework as a "curious hybrid" and an ill-fated attempt by the Court to "decree a middle
ground" where none can exist: "Analytically, there is no middle ground: A challenge either
has to be explained or it does not.").
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A. The Peremptory as a Litigation Tool
Few trial lawyers want to relinquish the peremptory challenge. 7 They
view jury selection as one key to winning their trial and the peremptory
challenge as a vital tool in securing the most favorable jury possible. The
peremptory challenge allows lawyers to remove those prospective jurors
whom they think will be unsympathetic to their client without having to
explain why they think so. The peremptory challenge is exercised by
lawyers, unlike the challenge for cause, which is left to the judge's
discretion. If a lawyer cannot persuade the judge that a prospective juror
should be removed for cause, the lawyer has the option of removing that
prospective juror with a peremptory challenge. Thus, the peremptory
challenge allows lawyers and their clients to feel that they have some
control in selecting
the jury and to feel comfortable with the jury that will
8
hear their case.
Although the number of peremptory challenges varies depending on the
type of case and whether it is in federal or state court, the number is fixed
by statute and/or rule, unlike the challenge for cause. For example, in civil
jury trials in federal court, each side has three peremptory challenges. 9 In
criminal jury trials in federal court, the number varies depending on
whether the case is a capital case (twenty peremptories for each side), a
felony (six for the government and ten for the defendant), or a misdemeanor
(three for each side). 10 In all cases, the limited number means that while
lawyers can remove those prospective jurors about whom they have the
gravest doubts, they must use their peremptories carefully. 11 Thus, the
peremptory challenge serves as a safety valve in the selection process; it
allows lawyers to tinker around the edges, but not to remake the jury
completely.
One indication of lawyers' unwavering support for the peremptory
challenge is that recent jury reform efforts, whether undertaken by national
7. See, e.g., David Berg, The Trial Lawyer, Litigation, Summer 2005, at 8, 11

("Because you can exercise 'peremptories' against a panelist for any reason (save race and
gender), they are invaluable."); John Gibeaut, ChallengingPeremptories,A.B.A. J.,Aug. 29,

2005, at 16 ("'[The peremptory challenge is] just too deeply ingrained ....It's hardwired
into our justice system ....' (quoting Charles L. Hobson, an attorney with the Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation, a group that backs prosecutors)).
8. See, e.g., Dennis Hale, All Rise: Trial by Jury Is Probably the Worst Way To
Administer Justice, Except All Others, B.C. Magazine, Summer 2005, at 26, available at

http://www.bc.edu/publications/bcm/summer2005/features.html
("[Peremptories]
give
attorneys some control (or perhaps only the illusion of control) over the unpredictability of
juries, and, with the right questions, increase the odds of avoiding the least desirable jurors
and seating the friendlier ones.").
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2000) ("In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three

peremptory challenges."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(b) ("The court shall allow the number of
peremptory challenges provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1870.").
10. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b).

11. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 7, at 11 ("[Y]ou get so few peremptories (rarely more
than six, often as few as three) that there is little margin for error in the exercise of each
one.").
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organizations or states, have come out in favor of maintaining the
peremptory challenge. Even though these organizations or committees,
usually consisting of lawyers, judges, and academics, recognize that the
peremptory challenge has been difficult to police and has led to juries that
are less diverse than they might otherwise be, they have been unwilling to
recommend the elimination of the peremptory.
The American Bar Association ("A.B.A."), a national organization
consisting exclusively of lawyers, recently adopted Principlesfor Juries
and Jury Trials12 ("A.B.A. Principles") that recommend maintaining the
peremptory challenge. A group of lawyers, judges, and academics working
under the heading of the American Jury Project created jury principles and
standards to serve as aspirations and guidelines respectively for state and
federal jury trials. The A.B.A. Principles were approved by the American
Jury Project in November 2005, and by the A.B.A. at its mid-year meeting
in February 2005. Although the A.B.A. Principlesare cutting-edge in many
ways-from the recommendation that jurors be permitted to ask written
questions of witnesses 13 to the recommendation that jurors be allowed to
engage in pre-verdict discussionsI 4 -with respect to the peremptory
challenge the A.B.A. Principles preserve the status quo. The A.B.A.
Principles simply recommend that "[p]eremptory challenges should be
5
available to each of the parties."'
In general, the A.B.A. Principles were written so that the prefatory
principles express aspirations for jury trials and the detailed standards
contain nuts-and-bolts recommendations. 16 Although the final version no
longer uses the term "standards," the structure remains unchanged. There
are principles, which are aspirational, and recommendations, which are
practical. However, with respect to peremptory challenges even the
workaday recommendations seem to take an overly optimistic view of
peremptories.
The A.B.A. Principles reflect how lawyers want to believe peremptory
challenges are used, rather than how they actually are used. For example,
the A.B.A. Principles"presume" that each party will exercise its peremptory
challenges properly and not engage in discriminatory peremptories. 17
However, past practice belies this presumption. As Justice Thurgood

12. Am. Bar Ass'n, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials (2005) [hereinafter A.B.A.
Principles], availableat http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababnalannual/2005/023.pdf.

13. Id. Principle 13.C (questioning witnesses).
14. Id.Principle 13.F (describing pre-verdict discussions).
15. Id.Principle 1I.D.
16. See, e.g., American Jury ProjectSets Standardsfor Juries, Center Ct., Winter 2005,

at 2, 7. "[T]he format of the 19 standards differs from the previous ones in that each
standard is prefaced by a stated principle. Then the standard, using the same number, gives
the means by which the principle is achieved or approached." Id.(paraphrasing G. Thomas
Munsterman, Director, Center for Jury Studies at the National Center for State Courts).
17. A.B.A. Principles, supra note 12, Principle 11 .F. I ("It should be presumed that each
party is utilizing peremptory challenges validly, without basing those challenges on
constitutionally impermissible reasons.").
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Marshall illustrated twenty years ago in Batson 18 when he referred to Dallas
prosecutors' practice of using peremptories to exclude African-Americans
from the jury, and as Justice David H. Souter illustrated more recently in
Miller-El v. Dretke 19 when he looked at Dallas prosecutors' peremptories to
exclude African-Americans from a jury in a capital case, such a
presumption is unrealistic. To "presume" that peremptories are exercised in
a permissible manner is to turn a blind eye to the history of this practice as
it has been highlighted in Supreme Court cases from Swain v. Alabama20 to
21 and now in the recent cases Johnson v. California2 2 and MillerBatson
23
El.
At the same time that the A.B.A. Principles make a presumption that is
not borne out by past practice, they retreat from limiting the number of
peremptories available to each side. In a rather vague formulation, the
A.B.A. Principles recommend a number that is "sufficient, but limited to a
number no larger than necessary to provide reasonable assurance of
obtaining an unbiased jury." 24 In addition, the A.B.A. Principles call for
courts to be able to provide additional peremptory challenges if they are
necessary. 25 In sum, the A.B.A. Principles maintain the peremptory as it is,
with numbers varying based on jurisdiction and type of case, and presume
that lawyers will exercise them in an appropriate manner. Although this
document is in many respects at the forefront of jury reform, when it comes
to the peremptory challenge the A.B.A. Principles,which speak for lawyers,
26
simply want to maintain the status quo.

Arizona, a state at the vanguard of jury reform, also maintained the status
quo when it came to the peremptory challenge. In the early 1990s, at the
behest of the Arizona Supreme Court, a committee consisting of lawyers,
judges, academics, and even some former jurors undertook a study of the
Its mandate was to produce "innovative
Arizona jury system. 27
changes." 28 The committee issued a report,
for
major
recommendations
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

476
125
380
476
125
125

U.S. 79, 104 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 2338-39 (2005).
U.S. 202 (1965).
U.S. at 79.
S. Ct. 2410 (2005).
S. Ct. at 2317.

24. A.B.A. Principles, supra note 12, Principle 11.D.2.

25. See id. Principle 11.D.3.
26. One way in which the A.B.A. Principlesseek to return to the past is that they instruct
courts to follow the Batson framework but do not acknowledge the changes wrought by
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). See A.B.A. Principles, supra note 12, Principle 1i.F.

In Elem, the Court established that as long as a reason for exercising a peremptory is race
neutral and not pretextual, that is all the Equal Protection Clause requires. 514 U.S. at 769.
The reason for exercising the peremptory need not be "related" to the case at hand, as Batson
had required. Id at 768-69.
27. For a more complete description of Arizona's jury reform efforts, particularly with
respect to its jury instructions, see Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions Into the
Twenty-First Century, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006).
28. B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79
Judicature 280, 280 (1996).
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Jurors: The Power of 12,29 in which it recommended fifty-five reforms,30
many of which were quite far-reaching. One of its more innovative
proposals, which was ultimately adopted, is that if a jury informs the judge
that it has reached an impasse in its deliberations, the judge, rather than
delivering an Allen charge, 31 can engage in further dialogue with the jury.
The judge can ask the jury whether it would be useful for the judge or
counsel to provide additional information or clarification on the issues over
which the jurors are still divided. 32 Other innovative proposals included
allowing jurors to discuss the case even while the trial is in progress,
permitting jurors to submit written questions to the witnesses, and allowing
lawyers to deliver mini-summaries of the case before voir dire to help detect
juror bias. 33 Each of these reforms was adopted. Of the fifty-five
recommendations, eighteen were initially adopted by the Arizona Supreme
34
Court after the report was issued.
In this maelstrom of reforms, however, the peremptory challenge
remained remarkably unchanged. One newspaper account described the
committee's report as a 200-page behemoth in which "[n]othing is
untouched" 35-nothing,
that is, other than the peremptory challenge.
Recommendation 23 of the report states as follows: "Continue Peremptory
Strikes in Present Form and Number[:] Peremptory strikes should be
retained in their present number, as they are necessary for the selection of a
fair jury." 36 As the chair of the committee, then Maricopa County Superior
Court Judge B. Michael Dann, explained in an article offering an insider's
view of the process and reforms, the issue of peremptory challenges was
one of "a few issues [that] sparked controversy and produced division
29. Ariz. Supreme Ct. Comm. on More Effective Use of Juries, Jurors: The Power of 12
(1994) [hereinafter The Power of 12].
30. Id. at 3.
31. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (holding that there was no error when
the jury returned for further instructions and the trial court judge instructed the jurors to
reexamine their views). The Allen charge has been described by one court as "a sharp punch
to the jury, reminding [the jurors] of the nature of their duty and the time and expense of a
trial, and urging them to try again to reach a verdict." United States v. Anderton, 679 F.2d
1199, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982). The Allen charge is used in federal courts and in many state
courts, even though it puts pressure on a jury to reach a verdict. But see People v. Gainer,
566 P.2d 997, 1006 (Cal. 1977) (en banc) (prohibiting the use of the Allen charge in
California state courts).
32. See, e.g., The Power of 12, supra note 29, at 26-27, 120-22 (describing
Recommendation 49, "Offer the Assistance of the Judge and Counsel to Deliberating Jurors
Who Report an Impasse"); Dann & Logan, supra note 28, at 283 ("Dialoguing on an
impasse").
33. See, e.g., The Power of 12, supra note 29, at 59-60, 90-92, 95-97 (recommending
mini-summaries, juror questions, and pre-verdict discussions); Dann & Logan, supra note
28, at 281, 283 (describing juror questions and discussion of evidence); William H. Carlile,
Arizona Jury Reforms Buck Legal Traditions: Power to the Jurors, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Feb. 22, 1996, at 1 (describing attorneys' mini-summaries).
34. See Carlile, supra note 33, at 1.
35. Christopher Johns, Jury Overhaul Needed, Now More Than Ever, Ariz. Republic,
Apr. 12, 1995, at B5.
36. The Power of 12, supranote 29, at 67.
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among committee members." 37 According to Dann, although most
members recognized that peremptories had been abused, they still voted in
favor of retaining them in their current number. 38 They believe that
peremptories are necessary "if jury selection was to be fair in fact and seen
to be fair by the litigant, who would see that he or she had some degree of
'39
control over an otherwise random selection process."
Only a few years prior to the Arizona reforms, the A.B.A. and the
Brookings Institution had convened a conference attended by lawyers,
academics, and judges. Although this conference resulted in national
newspaper coverage 40 and several publications, 4 1 its main purpose was to
reach consensus on next steps for jury reform. The recommended reforms
were sensible and modest.
Perhaps the most radical was the
recommendation to allow jurors to take notes, 42 which at the time was not
widely permitted. As to the peremptory challenge, however, the conference
participants rejected any change. They concluded as follows: "Some have
suggested that juror representativeness can best be assured by sharply
limiting or even prohibiting peremptory challenges, or challenges for which
no stated reason is required to be given. We question this premise and
43
believe, on balance, that peremptory challenges serve a useful purpose."
The conference was held only a few years after Batson and the participants
recognized that Batson44 and its progeny 45 put courts in the uncomfortable
position of deciding whether reasons were nondiscriminatory. However,
the final report of the conference members went no further than merely
37. Dann & Logan, supra note 28, at 285.
38. Id.

39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Cris Carmody, Deliberations Underway on Jury Trial System, Chi. Daily

L. Bull., June 19, 1992, at 1 ("Legal experts will debate the jury's role and its performance
this weekend at The Future of the Civil Trial, a symposium co-sponsored by the American
Bar Association and the Brookings Institution."); Cris Carmody, Jury System Wins Ringing
Endorsement, Chi. Daily L. Bull., June 22, 1992, at 1 ("[W]hat emerged [from the
symposium] was a ringing endorsement of the American jury."); Civil Juries Endorsed By
ABA Panel; Enhancements Are Proposed, Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 6, 1993, at 1 ("A

sweeping examination of the nation's civil jury system by more than 100 of the nation's top
legal experts and citizen groups has resulted in overwhelming support for the civil jury
system."); Claudia MacLachlan, Panel Says High-Tech Helps Jurors, Nat'l L.J., July 13,

1992, at 7 ("Lawyers and judges should take advantage of new technology to make decisions
easier for jurors, especially in complex, long-running cases, said a panel of legal experts
brought together recently by the Brookings Institution and the American Bar Association.");
David Margolick, A Callfor the Jurors to Take Bigger Roles in Trials, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,

1993, at A19 (describing a study "summariz[ing] the results of a three-day gathering in
Virginia last June during which practicing lawyers, judges and law professors submitted
papers and discussed the problems").
41. See generally A.B.A./Brookings Institution, Charting a Future for the Civil Jury

System (1992); Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
42. A.B.A./Brookings Institution, supra note 41, at 18 ("Perhaps the most widely
suggested reform for enhancing juror comprehension is to allow jurors to take notes during a
trial.").
43. Id. at 31-32.
44. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

45. See supra note 2.
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noting that "[a]s46 a result, the issues raised by peremptory challenges warrant
further study."
These initiatives, which offer some of the most forward-thinking and
innovative proposals on the jury, all recommended maintaining the
peremptory challenge. This suggests that lawyers feel strongly about the
peremptory challenge and believe that it is necessary for securing a fair
trial-or, at the very least, for reassuring a client that he will receive a fair
trial. Lawyers see the peremptory challenge as a vital tool of the litigator.
It is not surprising that Justice Stevens, as a former trial lawyer, would
share this view and have an abiding respect for the peremptory challenge.
As these reform efforts suggest, lawyers' commitment to the peremptory
challenge is deep-seated and widely shared.
B. The Peremptory as Partof Our Legal Tradition
Judges also have respect for the peremptory challenge, perhaps because it
has always been part of the American legal tradition. When the colonists
came to America, they brought the jury trial, along with the peremptory
challenge, from England. 4 7 In colonial America, the sheriff often selected
jurors who would be sympathetic to the British Crown. 4 8 A defendant
could try to remove jurors by recourse to a challenge for cause or a
peremptory challenge. 4 9 However, the challenge for cause would only be
granted by the judge on the grounds of specific bias, such as a familial tie or
an economic relation to one of the parties, and not on the grounds of general
bias, such as attitudes or political views. 50 The early American courts, like
the English courts, held the view that jurors should not be questioned about
their political beliefs and biases because they were not on trial. Thus, the
peremptory challenge was a mechanism for removing those jurors who
might be unsympathetic to the defendant because of their loyalties to the
Crown, but who could not be questioned during voir dire as to those
loyalties.
Even when loyalty to the British Crown was no longer an issue, the
peremptory remained part of our legal tradition. Jury trials, whether in
federal or state court, have always included peremptory challenges. The
peremptory challenge's intended use today is to allow lawyers to remove
those jurors whose attitudes or beliefs might in some subtle way color their
view of the case, even though the impairment does not rise to the level of
partiality required of a for-cause challenge. Today, as in colonial times, the
for-cause challenge requires specific grounds, such as familial connection

46. A.B.A./Brookings Institution, supra note 41, at 32.
47. See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 32-35 (1986).
48. Id. at 35 (describing the Crown's use of "every means possible to secure
convictions" once trials with increasing political significance began to appear in colonial

courts).
49. Id.

50. Id.
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or financial interest in the case, 5 1 whereas the peremptory challenge does
not. The peremptory challenge remains in the lawyers' hands, whereas the
for-cause challenge does not.
The peremptory challenge also relieves some of the judge's burden by
having both the judge and the lawyers participate in the selection of a jury.
Lawyers can seek to remove jurors with a for-cause challenge in a few
limited circumstances, such as when a juror has a familial relation with one
of the parties, a financial stake in the outcome of the case, or has said that
he cannot be impartial. The judge decides whether to grant the for-cause
challenge. There is no fixed number of for-cause challenges; it is simply
left to the judge's discretion. However, if the judge denies the for-cause
challenge, a lawyer can still remove that juror with a peremptory
challenge-the peremptory serves as the "back-up" to the for-cause
challenge. The result is a jury that the lawyer and client feel comfortable
with and one about which they cannot complain on appeal (except if the
judge erroneously denied a for-cause challenge after the lawyer used up his
peremptories, so a juror who should have been removed actually served on
52
the jury).
It is not surprising then that judges, with a few exceptions, 53 continue to
embrace the peremptory challenge. 54 The peremptory challenge has always
been part of our legal landscape; it has, as the Supreme Court once stated,
"very old credentials." 55 There is also a practical reason for judges to
support it: The peremptory serves as a further check on the judge's
decision about a for-cause challenge. If the lawyer disagrees with the
judge's decision she can use a peremptory to remove the juror in question.
Without the peremptory, the lawyer would have no alternative but to go
51. In Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887), the Supreme Court described
circumstances under which the for-cause challenge should be granted. The guidance it gives
to lower court judges is still relevant today:
1. Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be
injured by the offence charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was
instituted, or to the defendant;
2. Standing in the relation of guardian and ward, attorney and client, master and
servant, or landlord and tenant, or being a member of the family of the defendant,
or of the person alleged to be injured by the offence charged, or on whose
complaint the prosecution was instituted, or in his employment on wages;
8. Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief that the prisoner
is guilty or not guilty of the offence charged ....
Id. at 433.
52. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000) ("After objecting to
the District Court's denial of his for-cause challenge, Martinez-Salazar had the option of
letting Gilbert [a biased juror] sit on the petit jury and, upon conviction, pursuing a Sixth
Amendment challenge on appeal.").
53. See infra Part III.B.4.

54. But see Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges: Lawyers Are From Mars,
Judges Are From Venus, 3 Green Bag 2d 135 (2000) ("What I do want to talk about is the
following strange phenomenon: trial lawyers love peremptory challenges and trial judges
don't.").
55. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
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through the entire trial, and then raise the issue on appeal. With the
peremptory, the lawyer can still remove that juror and be satisfied that the
jury is one that will hear the case fairly.
There are both powerful historical and practical reasons for preserving
the peremptory challenge. Justice Stevens has both a deep respect for
history and for the difficult work that trial judges do. Either one of these
reasons might lead him to maintain the peremptory; when both reasons are
present, as they are here, it becomes much more difficult to reject the
practice.
II. A COMMITMENT TO ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION DURING JURY
SELECTION

Kentucky56

Batson v.
marked a turning point in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence with respect to the peremptory challenge, and Justice Stevens
played a key role in helping the Court to reach that turning point. One of
his earlier opinions, McCray v. New York, 57 helped to pave the way for
Batson.
A. Laying the Foundation
In Swain v. Alabama,58 decided in 1965, before Justice Stevens was on
the Court, the peremptory seemed sacrosanct. When the Court described
the peremptory challenge
in Swain it waxed eloquent on the peremptory's
"very old credentials" 5 9 and described it as "one of the most important of
'6 1
the rights secured to the accused 60 and "a necessary part of trial by jury."
The Court was reluctant to take any steps that would hamper a party's free
exercise of its peremptory challenges. Although the Court was disturbed
that prosecutors might be using the peremptory to strike African-Americans
from petit juries in case after case, and suggested that if this were true "it
would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being
perverted, '62 it chose to believe that prosecutors were not acting in this
manner. 63 After Swain, a defendant would have to show that the prosecutor
was exercising race-based peremptories not just in his case but in prior
cases as well; this evidentiary burden, as the Court later acknowledged,
proved to be "crippling" 64 for a defendant. In spite of the exceedingly

56. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
57. 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
58. 380 U.S. at 202.
59. Id. at 212.
60. Id. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
61. Id.
62. Id.at 224.
63. Id. at 222 ("The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is
using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the
court.").
64. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
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difficult evidentiary burden established in Swain, the issue of race-based
peremptories continued to be raised.
The issue resurfaced in McCray v. New York, 65 in which several criminal
defendant petitioners claimed in their petitions for writs of certiorari that the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude AfricanAmericans from their petit juries violated their right to an impartial jury
drawn from a fair cross section of the community, as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Justice Stevens, joined
by Justices Harry A. Blackmun and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., wrote a brief
opinion "respecting the denial of the petitions for writs of certiorari 66 in
which he explained his vote to deny the petitions. He noted that while the
67
issue was an important one, he thought it wise to let the issue percolate.
At the time, there were no conflicts among the federal circuits and only two
states had held that the prosecutor's use of discriminatory peremptories
violated provisions of their state constitutions. 68 He thought it "a sound
exercise of discretion" for the Court to let the states serve "as
laboratories," 69 as Justice Louis D. Brandeis had once advised, 70 and to let
the states and lower federal courts consider the issue before the Court did.
Thus, the Court would have the benefit of the lower courts' reasoning
before it addressed the issue.
Justice Stevens's opinion was significant in at least two ways. First, it
signaled to potential petitioners that three justices, in addition to Justices
Marshall and William J. Brennan, Jr., who dissented from the Court's
denial of the petitions for writs of certiorari, thought that the issue was
important and one that the Court should ultimately, though not
immediately, address. If Justice Stevens had not written an opinion there
would only have been the Court's denial of certiorari and the two dissenting
Justices' opinion. Potential petitioners would not have been able to gauge
how close the Court was to hearing the issue. It takes four Justices to grant
a petition for a writ of certiorari. With the aid of Justice Stevens's opinion
potential petitioners knew that five Justices thought the issue was one that
the Court should resolve.
Second, Justice Stevens's sense that the Court should wait proved to be
prescient. By waiting, the Court not only had the benefit of other lower
court judges' reasoning, but also the Court was able to take a case that
71
raised the issue on both Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds,
65. 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983).
66. Id. at 961.
67. Id. at 962.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 963.
70. See New State lee Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
71. There was some debate about this. CompareBatson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 10811 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining why the Fourteenth Amendment claim was
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whereas McCray had raised the issue on Sixth Amendment grounds only.
The difference proved to be critical. Batson v. Kentucky, decided on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, held that a prosecutor's exercise of racebased peremptories violated a defendant's right to equal protection. Once
the Court decided Batson, its logic became inexorable. If Batson applied to
prosecutors, then it should apply to defense attorneys; if it applied in
criminal cases, then it should apply in civil cases. Each incremental
72
extension of Batson seemed inevitable. In contrast, Holland v. Illinois,
decided on Sixth Amendment grounds, held that a prosecutor's exercise of
race-based peremptories did not violate a white defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community. 73 The Fourteenth Amendment proved to be a viable route for
challenging discriminatory peremptories, whereas the Sixth Amendment
became a dead end. 74 If the dead-end route had come first-a distinct
possibility if the Court had granted certiorari in McCray-then the only
successful route to challenge discriminatory peremptories might not have
been discovered or might not have been successful after the dead-end route
had been announced.
B. Nondiscriminationin Batson andIts Progeny
In Batson, the Court began to acknowledge the importance of
nondiscrimination during jury selection and it expanded this principle in the
Batson progeny. Justice Stevens was part of the majority in Batson that
recognized the importance of eliminating discrimination during jury
selection, and in later cases he reminded the Court of its commitment to
nondiscrimination even when a majority seemed to have strayed from it.
In Batson, and later in the Batson progeny, the Court identified harms
that discriminatory peremptories caused, including harms not only to the
75
defendant, but also to the excluded juror and to the community at large.

included in the question presented), with id. at 112-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (explaining
why the Fourteenth Amendment claim was not properly before the Court).
72. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).

73. Id. at 487.
74. 1 have written elsewhere why I think the Sixth Amendment would have provided a
better approach than the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminating discriminatory peremptory
challenges. See Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of

the Jury, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1041, 1114-36 (1995). The incremental approach required by the
Fourteenth Amendment, which I have criticized as piecemeal, seemed more manageable
than the Sixth Amendment to a majority of the Justices. For example, Justice Anthony
Kennedy explained in his concurrence in Holland v. Illinois that he joined the Court's
opinion because he thought the Sixth Amendment had no "limiting principle to make it
workable in practice" for a white defendant to challenge the prosecutor's exercise of a racebased peremptory challenge, but if a white defendant raised the same claim under "the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, it would have merit." 493 U.S. at 488
(Kennedy, J., concurring).

75. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
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Although earlier cases, such as Peters v. Kiff76 and Ballard v. United
States,7 7 recognized that discrimination at the venire stage-namely, the
systematic exclusion of African-Americans or women from the venireharmed others in addition to the defendant, Batson was the first case to
focus on these harms when the peremptory challenge was at stake.
Batson recognized multiple harms from race-based peremptory
challenges. Race-based peremptories violated a defendant's right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because such peremptories
denied him the right to a jury that is indifferently chosen and free from
governmental control. 78 However, race-based peremptories also harmed
the excluded jurors who were, in effect, being told that they were less
desirable than white jurors because of their race. Members of the
community also were harmed because a jury selection process that is tainted
by discrimination leads them to question "the fairness of our system of
justice." 79 African-Americans might question whether a jury system in
which lawyers could remove jurors because of their race was one whose
verdicts they should accept. Similarly, whites might question whether a
jury system that could be so flagrantly manipulated was one whose verdicts
they should accept.
In Powers v. Ohio,80 the next in the Batson line of cases, the majority
expounded on the multiple harms caused by race-based peremptory
challenges. In Powers, a white defendant challenged the prosecutor's
exercise of peremptory challenges to remove African-American jurors from
his jury. The Court noted that a defendant of any race has "the right to be
tried by a jury whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory
criteria." 8 1 To allow anything less would be to invite "cynicism respecting
82
the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law."
Nondiscriminatory jury selection, the Court explained, is essential;
otherwise, jurors who are excluded based on discriminatory peremptories
will feel stigmatized. The excluded jurors also will lose the opportunity
that other citizens have to be educated by jury service. Alexis de
Tocqueville, writing 170 years ago, had identified the education of the
citizenry as one of the greatest contributions of the jury system. According
to Tocqueville, the jury serves as a "free school" for its citizens, teaching

76. 407 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1972) (recognizing that the harm from the systematic
exclusion of African-Americans from the grand and petit juries extended beyond the harm to
the defendant and included harm to the excluded jurors and to the community as well).
77. 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) ("The injury [caused by systematically excluding women
from the venire] is not limited to the defendant-there is injury to the jury system, to the law
as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the
processes of our courts.").
78. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
79. Id.
80. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
81. Id. at404.
82. Id. at 412.

1696

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 74

them about self-governance in a democracy. 83 Citizens who are struck
from the jury by virtue of their race are denied that education, which is one
of the badges of citizenship.
Finally, community members are harmed because they lose faith in the
fairness of the trial process. The exercise of peremptories takes place in
open court, beneath the American flag, the judicial seal, the watchful eye of
the judge, and often before a courtroom filled with members of the public
and press. When peremptories are exercised based on race, it is apparent
for all to see, as one African-American juror after another is dismissed. 84
Exclusions based on race, as the Court recognized in Powers, taint not only
the jury selection process, but also the remainder of the trial, and leave
those who witness it with the belief that the proceedings cannot be fair. In
sum, discriminatory peremptories do harm to the "dignity of persons and
the integrity of the courts. ' '85
The other Batson progeny, including Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co.,86 Georgia v. McCollum, 87 and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,88 all built
upon the framework established in Batson and developed more fully in
Powers.89 Each of these cases expanded the reach of Batson and reinforced
the Court's commitment to nondiscrimination during jury selection.
Edmonson established that race-based peremptories were impermissible in
civil cases 90 and that "discrimination on the basis of race in selecting a jury
in a civil proceeding harms the excluded juror no less than discrimination in
a criminal trial." 9 1 McCollum held that criminal defendants are also
prohibited from exercising race-based peremptories in criminal cases and
noted that "[i]t is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the
right to discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race."'92
J.E.B. extended Batson so that peremptories could no longer be exercised
on the basis of gender. In reaching this ruling, the Court was careful to note
83. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 275 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Anchor Press 1969) (1840).
84. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 412.
A prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based peremptory challenge
is a constitutional violation committed in open court at the outset of the
proceedings. The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt
over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the
law throughout the trial of the cause.
Id.
85. Id.at 402.

86. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
87. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
88. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
89. Powers, 499 U.S. at 400. I do not include Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352

(1991), in this line of cases because it was decided on fact-specific grounds.
90. Edmonson was decided on equal protection grounds, but it was based on the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than on the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, see Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616, which
the Court has long recognized to afford the same protections against federal, as opposed to
state, actors. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
91. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
92. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57.
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that this did not signal the end of all peremptory challenges; rather, it
'93
simply meant that gender could "not serve as a proxy for bias.
C. Justice Stevens's Role in Maintainingthe Integrity of Batson
After almost a decade of Batson and its progeny, the Court suddenly
veered away from the delicate balance it had struck in Batson between
preserving the peremptory and protecting the principle of nondiscrimination
in jury selection. In Purkett v. Elem,94 a per curiam opinion, the Court
undermined Batson by allowing parties to give any race-neutral reason at
step two of the Batson analysis even if this reason was unrelated to the case
or entirely implausible. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, took issue with
the Court's approach and urged it to return to the principles underlying
95
Batson.
In Elem, the Court undermined the protections of Batson. Elem had
objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude two
African-American men from the jury. The trial judge never ruled on
whether Elem had established a prima facie case of race-based
peremptories; instead, the prosecutor simply offered an explanation for his
strikes. He said that he had struck both jurors because of their hair. One
had "'long hair' and "'a mustache and a goatee type beard"' and the other
also had a "'mustache and goatee type beard.' 9 6 The prosecutor explained
that he did not "'like the way they looked' and that their facial hair
"'look[ed] suspicious"' to him. 97 He further explained that the second juror
had been the victim of a robbery with a shotgun and might assume that guns
were necessary to robberies. The trial judge overruled Elem's objections
and empanelled the jury. After his conviction, Elem raised his Batson
challenge on appeal, but the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, finding
that the prosecutor's explanation "'constituted a legitimate hunch.' '98 On
habeas review, the Eighth Circuit reversed as to the first juror because it
believed that Batson required "'some plausible race-neutral reason for
believing those factors will somehow
affect the person's ability to perform
99
his or her duties as a juror.'
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, and in doing so, altered
the Batson test. In Batson, the Court established a three-step test to
challenge the exercise of a peremptory challenge. Step one requires the
objecting party to establish a "prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination."' 0 0 Step two shifts the burden to the party attempting to
exercise the peremptory to give neutral reasons that are "related to the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

JE.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
514 U.S. 765 (1995).
Id. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.at 766.
Id.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 767 (citations omitted).
100. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).

1698

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

particular case to be tried."10 1 Finally, step three requires the trial judge to
decide whether the reasons are pretextual. 10 2
The Court in Elem
reinterpreted Batson so that a lawyer's reasons given at step two need not
be related to the particular case and can even be silly and fanciful as long as
the reasons are race neutral. 0 3 At step two, "a 'legitimate reason' is not a
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal
protection." 0 4 The Court explained that it is only at step three that the trial
judge might find those silly or fanciful reasons to be pretextual. 105
Justice Stevens dissented from this alteration to the Batson test. On
procedural grounds, he thought the Court should not have altered the
Batson test without providing for full briefing and oral argument. 10 6 On
substantive grounds, this change undercut the effectiveness of Batson.
Whereas Batson had required that the reason given for a peremptory be
related to the case, the Court now permitted any reason, no matter how
ludicrous, as long as it did not mention race. As Justice Stevens explained,
it is difficult to see the difference between any reason at all, such as "'the
juror had a beard,' or 'the juror's last name began with the letter 'S"" and
08
the statement, "'I had a hunch,' 10° 7 which Batson expressly prohibited.
The Court's distinction between reasons given by a lawyer at step two that
were fanciful but race neutral and the judge's ruling at step three on
whether a fanciful reason was actually pretextual made little sense. Justice
Stevens pointed out that "preoccupation with the niceties of a three-step
analysis should not foreclose meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial
explanations that are entirely unrelated to the case to be tried."' 0 9 Justice
Stevens agreed with the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Antwine1 10 and
the Eighth Circuit in Elem v. Purkett:1 1 Silly reasons that are irrelevant to
a case make a charade of Batson and "demean[] the importance 1 of
the
12
values vindicated by [the U.S. Supreme Court's] decision in Batson."
Justice Stevens's dissent in Elem was an attempt to maintain Batson's
integrity. Although he did not persuade a majority of the Court to join him

101. Id.at 98.
102. Id.
103. Elem, 514 U.S. at 768.

104. Id.at 769.
105. Id.at 768.
106. Id.at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id.at 775.
108. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) ("Nor may the prosecutor rebut the
defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or affirm[ing] [his]
good faith in making individual selections." (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in
original)).
109. Elem, 514 U.S. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. 743 S.W.2d 51, 65 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) ("Were facially neutral explanations
sufficient without more, Batson would be meaningless.... We do not believe the Supreme
Court intended a charade when it announced Batson.").
111. 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994).
112. Elem, 514 U.S. at 778.
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in Elem, he did in Johnson v. California,113 which was another effort to
maintain Batson's integrity.
In Johnson, the Court considered the validity of California's practice
which required an objector to a peremptory challenge to show that "'it
[was] more likely than not"' 1 14 that the other party's peremptory was based
on race. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, struck down this
practice under Batson. The defendant, an African-American, had objected
after the prosecutor exercised three of his twelve peremptory challenges to
remove the three African-American jurors from the venire. The trial judge
did not require the prosecutor to explain his strikes because under
California precedent a party had to show "a strong likelihood" that the
peremptories were based on race and the trial judge thought that the three
African-American jurors' questionnaires contained answers that could
explain their removal. 1 15 The California Court of Appeals reversed,
reasoning that Batson required only an "inference" of discrimination in
order to establish a prima facie case. 1 16 The California Supreme Court
reinstated the conviction on the grounds that Batson permitted states to
117
define the standards to be used for establishing a prima facie case.
In his opinion, Justice Stevens made clear that while states are free to
design procedures for implementing Batson they are not free to recast the
standards created by Batson.118 Step one of Batson provides that a
defendant can establish a prima facie case "by showing that the totality 119
of
the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose."
At step one, Batson requires only "an inference of discriminatory purpose,"
and that inference can be met in a number of ways. 120 Once the objecting
party has satisfied that inference, then the burden shifts, and at step two, the
prosecutor must give reasons for using the peremptory. From the objecting
party's prima facie case and the prosecutor's reasons, the trial judge must
decide whether the peremptory was improperly motivated. 12 1 As Justice
Stevens explained, the Batson Court did not intend to make the first step
"so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the judge . . . that the
challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful
discrimination."' 122 Rather, the defendant can meet Batson's first step by
providing the trial judge with evidence sufficient to draw "an inference"
that discrimination has occurred. Thus, the Court held that California's
"more likely than not" standard was inconsistent with the Batson

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005).
Id.at 2413 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2414.
Id.at 2414-15.
Id. at2415.
Id. at 2416.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986).
Id.at 96.
See supra notes 100-03.
Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2417.
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standard. 12 3 Indeed, it was requiring objecting parties to do more than
Batson required at the first step.
Justice Stevens's opinion in Purkett v. Elem was a valiant effort to
convince the Court not to whittle away the Batson requirements. His
opinion in Johnson v. Californiawas a successful defense of Batson from
one of the more onerous burdens imposed upon objectors to the exercise of
a peremptory challenge. His efforts to protect the integrity of Batson are
admirable, and as long as Batson remains in place, they are necessary. The
question, however, is whether the protections Batson offers are too
ineffectual to prevent discrimination during jury selection. Quite simply, is
Batson worth the struggle? Or, is it time for a more effective way of
eliminating discrimination during jury selection?
III. REASSESSING BATSON AFTER TWENTY YEARS
The twentieth anniversary of Batson marks an appropriate time to
reassess whether Batson has been effective in eliminating discrimination
during jury selection. There was a little more than a twenty-year interval
between Swain and Batson,124 which gave the lower courts time to
implement Swain and gave the Supreme Court time to observe how Swain
worked in practice.
Twenty years after Swain, the Batson Court
125
reconfirmed its commitment to nondiscrimination in jury selection,
reassessed the evidentiary burden it had created in Swain, and held that the
evidentiary burden was too onerous for defendants to meet.1 2 6 Another
twenty years have gone by since Batson and lower courts have now had
sufficient experience in implementing it. An appropriate interval has
elapsed to consider what Batson has accomplished. The Batson framework
was a compromise shaped by two competing goals-preserving the
peremptory challenge and eliminating discrimination during jury
selection-so it is not surprising that it has produced mixed results. It has
preserved the peremptory, but to what extent has it eliminated
discrimination during jury selection?
A. The Benefits of Batson
1. Requiring Lawyers and Judges To Think About Race and Gender
One of the benefits of Batson is that it makes lawyers think about race
and gender during jury selection. Whenever lawyers exercise a peremptory
challenge, they must consider whether it will raise a Batson challenge from
the other side, and if so, whether they can give acceptable reasons for its
123. 1d at 2416.
124. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), was decided in 1965 and Batson was
decided in 1986.
125. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 (explaining that the Court has been consistent in its views that
discrimination should play no role in jury selection).
126. Id. at 92.
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exercise. Although the reasons required of lawyers are not demanding, this
process requires lawyers to take care when exercising their peremptories.
Lawyers might still exercise discriminatory peremptories, but they might
not do it as often and certainly not in as obvious a manner as pre-Batson.
Batson shapes lawyers' exercise of peremptories because it forces them to
think about whether they could defend their exercise of peremptories if
challenged by the other side.
Batson also makes judges think about race and gender during jury
selection. Every time lawyers object to the other side's peremptory
challenge judges must determine whether the objecting side has established
a prima facie case of race or gender discrimination, and if so, whether the
reasons given for the peremptory are race neutral and not pretextual. Trial
judges are in the trenches when it comes to Batson challenges. Trial judges,
unlike appellate judges who have only the transcript of the proceedings
below, have the lawyers and jurors before them. They have facts that might
not end up on the record, such as the juror's race, body language, or tone of
voice, and they often have to assess the credibility of lawyers when they
provide their reasons. With the adoption of the A.B.A. Principles,judges
must give even greater thought than before to race and gender during jury
selection. 127 Rather than leaving it only to lawyers to raise Batson
challenges, the A.B.A. Principles explicitly instruct judges that they can
28
raise Batson challenges sua sponte. 1
Some psychologists' empirical studies of race and jury decision making
suggest that when race is made salient for jurors, either by asking about race
during voir dire or by seating a racially diverse jury, white jurors expressed
greater concern about racial prejudice during deliberations. 129 It could be
that Batson challenges serve a similar function for white lawyers and
judges. Batson challenges could make race and gender more salient issues
for white lawyers and judges and perhaps make them more aware of gender
and race issues throughout the trial, just as race-related questions during
voir dire encourage white jurors to think about race during the
deliberations.
According to two mock juror studies 130 conducted by Professors Samuel
R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, white jurors were more attuned to
potential prejudice against an African-American defendant when they were
127. See A.B.A. Principles, supra note 12.
128. See id. Principle 11.F.5. ("When circumstances suggest that a peremptory challenge
was used in a constitutionally impermissible manner, the court on its own initiative, if
necessary, shall advise the parties on the record of its belief that the challenge is
impermissible, and its reasons for so concluding and shall require the party exercising the
challenge to make a showing under (Principle] F.3. above.").
129. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know
About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 Chi.-Kent L.

Rev. 997 (2003).
130. I use "mock juror studies" to refer to Samuel R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth's
two studies that examined individual mock jurors' verdict preferences. I use "mock jury
study" to refer to Sommers's study in which mock jurors were assigned to juries and had an
opportunity to deliberate.
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asked questions about race during voir dire.131 In one mock juror study, for
example, white mock jurors rated the African-American defendant guilty
more often and assigned him a longer sentence when no racial context was
provided. 132 However, when the white mock jurors were made to think
about race beforehand by being given a racial context for the incident in
question, they were equally likely to vote to convict the defendant whether
33
they were told he was white or African-American. 1
Sommers and Ellsworth replicated their results in a later mock juror
study. Using a different trial scenario, the authors presented white mock
jurors with an assault case involving high school basketball teammates. In
one version of the scenario, a defense witness mentioned the racial tension
that had permeated the locker room all season; in another, the witness
provided a race-neutral context for the assault. White mock jurors were
more likely to convict the African-American defendant than the white
defendant when the racial issues were not presented than when they were.
The results of these studies led the authors to hypothesize that "[w]hite
juror bias is actually more likely to occur in134trials without salient racial
issues, where norms regarding race are weak."'
In a later mock jury study conducted by Somners, mock jurors were
shown a videotape of a rape trial involving an African-American defendant
135
and then given an opportunity to deliberate as part of six-person juries.
Some of the mock jurors had been asked about their attitudes on race and
racial bias in the legal system as part of a written voir dire questionnaire.
The purpose of these questions, according to the author, was "to force mock
jurors to think about their racial attitudes and, more generally, about social
36
norms against racial prejudice and institutional bias in the legal system.'
One finding of this study was that both white and African-American mock
jurors were less likely to vote to convict the African-American defendant
when they were forced to think about racial issues beforehand. 137 The
study also showed that racially mixed juries tended to deliberate longer,
discuss more facts, raise more questions, and discuss more racial issues than
all-white juries. 138 In addition, racially mixed juries made fewer factual
errors than the all-white juries, and when there were factual inaccuracies
they were more likely to be corrected in the racially mixed juries than in the
all-white juries. 139 Finally, white jurors on racially mixed juries were less
likely to vote to convict an African-American defendant than white jurors
131. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 129, at 1015-16, 1026-28.
132. Id. at 1015.
133. Id.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
Id. at 1028.
See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making:

Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations,90 J. Personality

& Soc. Psychol. (forthcoming 2006).
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on all-white juries. 140 These findings led Sommers and Ellsworth to
conclude that "membership on a racially mixed jury might be another way
in which White jurors' motivations to avoid prejudice are activated, thereby
4
affecting subsequent trial judgments."' '1
Although it has not been tested empirically, my hypothesis is that the
Batson framework, and the discussion it requires among lawyers and judges
about race and gender, could serve a similar function as the race-related
voir dire questions used by Sommers and Ellsworth. Lawyers and judges
who are forced to think about race and gender during the voir dire may be
more aware of these issues throughout the rest of the trial.14 2 Thus, Batson
might serve a useful triggering function for lawyers and judges even if the
test is not a stringent one and does not effectively weed out discriminatory
peremptories.
2. Allaying Jurors' Concerns
Empirical evidence also suggests that jurors do not take offense at
lawyers' exercise of peremptory challenges, and so Batson could raise
issues of race and gender without actually leaving struck jurors feeling
disillusioned or betrayed by the process.
In Professor Mary Rose's study of 207 North Carolina jurors in a single
courthouse who were struck from thirteen criminal juries, she found that
they generally understood and accepted that this was part of the adversarial
process. 143 Rose observed the entire jury selection and then interviewed
those jurors who were struck from the jury either by for-cause or
peremptory challenges. She found that those jurors who thought they might
have been excused based on some personal characteristic (which could be a
personal characteristic related to the case, such as the case involved a
homicide and the juror's relative had been the victim of a homicide, or one
unrelated to the case, such as the juror's race or gender) were the least
satisfied with the decision. 144 However, Rose also found that even those
jurors still had a positive view of jury selection, believed that they had been
treated fairly, and were willing to serve again.' 45 Rose concluded that
"[there is] little support for those who worry that excused jurors will feel
that they have been treated unfairly at the hands of the court. All jurors,
140. Sommers & Eilsworth, supra note 129, at 1028,
141. Id.
142. Instead of having a positive effect, however, the attention given to Batson challenges
during voir dire could have a negative effect. Just as the attention given to deathqualification during voir dire in capital cases leaves jurors thinking that they must impose the
death penalty during the sentencing phase, the attention given to Batson during voir dire
could leave jurors thinking about race or gender in a negative light. The effects, whether
positive or negative, are in need of empirical testing. I thank Justice Stevens for bringing
this comparison to my attention. See infra Part'V.E.
143. See Mary R. Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to Jurors' Views Regarding
the Peremptory Challenge,78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1061, 1066-67 (2003).
144. See id. at 1075-77, 1085.
145. See id. at 1090.
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including those who had been excused, had high ratings of fair
treatment." 146 Overall, excused jurors had an understanding of jury
selection as part of the adversarial process and were generally accepting of
it. 147

3. Reassuring Parties
As discussed in Part I.A, parties and their lawyers take solace in the
peremptory challenge and by preserving the peremptory challenge Batson
continues to reassure parties that their jury has been fairly selected. The
peremptory challenge allows parties to exercise some control over the
selection of the jury. They are able to excuse a limited number of jurors
with peremptories. Typically, they will not have to give any reason for the
exercise of their peremptories. Moreover, parties can hope that their lawyer
is particularly adept at removing unsympathetic or hostile jurors and that
this will give them an advantage at trial. Whether their lawyers are truly
able to do this is another question, 148 but at the very least, parties are
reassured that the jury was fairly chosen because their lawyers had some
role in shaping it.
Batson reassures parties not only by preserving the peremptory, but also
by providing some recourse for the party who feels that the other side has
engaged in discrimination during jury selection. If there were no check on
either side's exercise of the peremptory one or both sides might exercise
discriminatory peremptories with impunity.
The exercise of one
discriminatory peremptory is enough to raise a Batson challenge. Without
any check a party might try to eliminate all jurors who are members of
racial or ethnic minorities. Given their small numbers in the population and
their small numbers on the venire, it does not take many peremptories to
eliminate all minorities from the jury. Batson provides some basis for a
party to challenge the other side's use of discriminatory peremptories. It
might not provide a strong basis, but it does provide something. The party
who raised the Batson challenge might feel reassured that at least the other
side had to explain itself.
Batson is most effective when a party claims to have excluded a minority
juror for a particular reason but does not strike a white juror for that same
146. Id. at 1094.
147. Id. at 1097. But for a contrary view, based on judicial experience rather than
empirical study, see Hoffman, supra note 54, at 137. Judge Morris B. Hoffman observed
that jurors who were removed through peremptory challenges were "angry" and those in the
courtroom who witnessed the peremptory process found it "bizarre and irrational." Id. at
137-38.
148. See, e.g., Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a FederalDistrict Court, 30 Stan. L.
Rev. 491 (1978). This Article described an empirical study comparing twelve actual
criminal juries' verdicts with twelve shadow juries' verdicts in the same cases and found that
the lawyers' selection of jurors made no difference to the verdicts in seven trials, and had
only a marginal effect in two trials. Id. However, in three cases, the selection might have
made a difference. Id.
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reason. In this situation, courts have often found the party's proffered
reason to be a pretext for discrimination. In one case, in which the
prosecutor exercised peremptories against the only Latino juror and
alternate, the Ninth Circuit reversed because the reasons the prosecutor
gave did not lead the prosecutor to strike a white juror as well. 14 9 The
prosecutor explained that he had struck the Latino juror because of his
residence and employment, but he did not strike a white juror with the same
residence. 150 However, courts have not always been consistent in their
practices.151
4. Changing Societal Norms
Batson has changed acceptable discourse about race and gender in the
courtroom. After Batson, lawyers learned that they could no longer identify
a juror's race as the basis for excluding that juror from the jury. After
J.E.B., lawyers learned that they could no longer identify a juror's gender as
the basis for excluding her from the jury. After Batson but before J.E.B., a
lawyer could explain that he was exercising his peremptory challenge
against a juror not because she was African-American, which Batson
prohibited, but because she was a woman.152 For example, in UnitedStates
v. Omoruyi, 153 a case from the Ninth Circuit, the prosecutor who struck an
unmarried African-American woman, but not an unmarried white woman,
explained his strike in this way: "'Because she was a single female and my
concern, frankly, is that she, like the other juror I struck, is single and given
defendant's good looks would be attracted to the defendant.""' 54 The
prosecutor stated this on the record and in open court, and the judge
accepted it as a valid reason for the exercise of his peremptory. 155 At that
time, as long as the prosecutor did not rely on race he was free to
discriminate on any other ground, according to Supreme Court precedent,
though not according to Ninth Circuit precedent. 156 After J.E.B., however,
lawyers learned that gender was no longer an acceptable basis for exclusion.
Although a lawyer exercising a peremptory might still be influenced by a
juror's gender that lawyer must provide a different reason upon demand by
the other side. Lawyers' public reasons for exercising peremptories had to
149. United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989).
150. Id.

151. For a list of reasons that some judges accepted as race neutral, whereas other judges
did
not,
see
Reasons
To
Exclude
a
Juror,
http://www.dallasnews.com/s/dws/spe/2005/jury/strikes.html
(last visited Dec. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Reasons to Exclude]. Among the reasons that some judges upheld as race

neutral whereas others considered them to be a pretext for race bias were the following:
"Had no teeth," "Jewelry," "Foreign-bom," "Gave bad first impression." Id.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See, e.g., United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 880.
Id.at 881.
Seeid.

156. The Ninth Circuit had extended Batson to gender several years before the Supreme
Court did so in JE.B.See United States v. DeGross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane)
(extending Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges).
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change, even if their personal attitudes changed more slowly. One benefit
of the Batson line of cases is that the reasons that could be given in the
public setting of the courtroom had changed, and this was a first step
toward ridding jury selection of discriminatory peremptories.
B. The Harms of Batson
1. Permitting a Charade
One of the harms of Batson is that lawyers have learned to play the
"Batson game." As long as they give a reason-any reason-that does not
involve a juror's race or gender, then they have satisfied Batson's
command. Although this is a benefit of Batson-that lawyers no longer
explain that they are striking a juror because of her race or gender-this is
also a serious harm. Lawyers still might be motivated to exclude a juror
because of her race or gender but they have learned to provide other
explanations for the exercise of their peremptories.
Although Batson was an earnest attempt to root out discriminatory
peremptories, Batson is so easy to circumvent that it allows a charade in the
courtroom. Instead of giving race or gender as a reason for excluding
jurors, lawyers can give any other reason no matter how "silly or
superstitious."' 157 They have adjusted their reasons to those that have
passed the Batson test. They know to explain away the dismissal of jurors
because of their profession, 158 clothing, 159 or even the way they wear their
hair. 160 They can rely on a juror's body language, including hesitation in
responding to a question, 16 1 staring, 162 or lack of eye contact. 163 One judge
compiled a list, supported by Illinois case law, which he suggested that
157. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
158. See, e.g., United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding
that a prosecutor's reasons for exercising a peremptory against the only African-American
woman on the jury because of her age, number of children, and profession (computer
analyst) were race neutral and not a pretext for racial bias).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
prosecutor's reason for exercising a peremptory against an African-American because he
dressed "like a rock star" was race neutral).
160. See Elem, 514 U.S. at 766 ('I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his long
hair. He had long curly hair.... And juror number twenty-four also has a mustache and
goatee type beard.... And I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut,
both of them."' (quoting the prosecutor)).
161. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1991) ("'I didn't feel, when I
asked [these two jurors] whether or not they could accept the interpreter's translation of it, I
didn't feel that they could. They each looked away from me and said with some hesitancy
that they would try, not that they could .... ' (quoting the prosecutor)).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, No. 92-5571, No. 92-5587, 1993 U.S. App.
Lexis 22373, at *1, *10 (4th Cir. Sept. 1, 1993) (holding that the prosecutor's reasons for
exercising a peremptory against an African-American juror who "stared" at the prosecutor
and might have difficulty with the complexities of the case were acceptable reasons).
163. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 357 n.1 ("'I just felt from the hesitancy in [the jurors']
answers and their lack of eye contact that they would not be able to do it."' (quoting the
prosecutor)).
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prosecutors could distribute under the heading of "'Handy Race-Neutral
' 64
Explanations' or '20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.""
According to the Dallas Daily News, such a list was distributed by the
Texas District and County Attorney Association in its 2004 Prosecutor Trial
65
Skills Course.1
The difficulty with the Batson approach is that it allows lawyers to
appear as though they are acting without discriminatory purpose, even when
they might be motivated by such purpose. Lawyers have simply learned
how to mask discriminatory peremptories. However, when those who are
struck are African-American and/or female, the lawyers' reasons, though
permissible under Batson, will appear disingenuous to the party objecting to
the challenge, to the excluded juror, and to the community at large. These
166
are the multiple harms that Batson recognized and sought to prevent.
Thus, Batson can end up causing harm to the "dignity of persons and the
integrity of the courts"'167 despite the Court's intent to protect against those
harms. Batson allows lawyers to give reasons that do not include race or
gender and allows judges to confirm that the reasons are permissible, while
everyone else in the courtroom sees the race and gender of the excluded
jurors. 1 68 The "overt wrong," as the Powers Court noted, is "often apparent

to the entire jury panel" and "casts doubt" on the trial proceedings 169 even
though this is what Batson and its progeny tried to prevent.
2. Producing Inconsistencies
Some trial judges have tried to conduct a more searching inquiry under
Batson and this creates uncertainty as to which reasons satisfy Batson.
What might be an acceptable reason for a peremptory in one courtroom may
be rejected in another. For example, prosecutors have justified excusing
African-American jurors in drug cases because they live in or near the
neighborhood where the crime allegedly occurred. In some courtrooms,
this has been an acceptable reason for the exercise of a peremptory and has

164. State v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (Il. App. Ct. 1996) (suggesting that the list

could include "too old, too young, divorced, 'long, unkempt hair,' free-lance writer, religion,

social worker, renter, lack of family contact, attempting to make eye-contact with defendant,
'lived in an area consisting predominantly of apartment complexes,' single, over-educated"
(footnotes omitted)).
165. Reasons To Exclude, supra note 151 (including the following reasons: "Agreed with
O.J. Simpson verdict"; "[flavorite TV show was Judge Judy"; "[d]istrust of newspapers";
"[l]imited reading material: 'mystery, romance novels and the Bible"'; "[n]o religious
preference; participated in church activities"; "[w]atched gospel TV programs").
166. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) ("The harm from discriminatory
jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch
the entire community.").
167. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
168. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) ("In full
view of the public, litigants press their cases, witnesses give testimony, juries render
verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care to ensure that justice is done.").
169. Powers, 499 U.S. at 412.
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withstood a Batson challenge. 170 In other courtrooms, however, judges
have recognized that it could be another way of striking African-Americans
because the neighborhood at issue consists largely of African-American
residents. 171 Thus, when judges examine the reasons more thoroughly they
reach a different result than when judges accept the reasons at face value.
What is acceptable in one courtroom as satisfying the command of Batson
proves to be unacceptable in another courtroom.
3. Deferring to Trial Judges
Although appellate review could correct this problem, at least by
ensuring consistency within a circuit, appellate review of Batson challenges
tends to be quite deferential to the trial judge. 172 This is understandable
because the trial judge sees the lawyers and jurors before her, but the
appellate panel does not. In addition, the record does not always reflect all
the information available to the trial judge. Sometimes the record does not
even include the race of the juror and the trial judge declines to ask the juror
to identify his or her race. Yet, race is important to a Batson challenge.
Because of the inherent limitations on appellate review, appellate judges
tend to defer to the rulings of the trial judge on Batson challenges.
For example, in the Seventh Circuit between 1986 and 2005 forty-two
Batson challenges were raised on appeal in published opinions that appear
in the Lexis database. 173 In thirty-four of these cases, or eighty-one
percent, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court judge
on the Batson claim. There were eight cases, or nineteen percent, in which
170. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 96-4002, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16315, at
*5 (4th Cir. July 3, 1997) (holding that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge against an
African-American female juror in a drug case "because she lived in a neighborhood known
for drug trafficking activities and that during questioning she stared coldly at the prosecutor"
constituted "an adequate, race-neutral reason for striking the juror"); United States v.
Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting as "race-neutral on its face" the
government's explanation that it exercised a peremptory challenge against an AfricanAmerican female juror "because of [her] likely place of residence, she was more likely to
have had direct exposure to a drug trafficking situation than other potential jurors as a
class"); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1488-89 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The government
explicitly stated that [an African-American male juror's] last three separate addresses where
he had resided in the immediate past were geographically close to the addresses of [two
witnesses].... [W]e affirm the trial court's determination that the government's reasons for
challenging [this prospective juror] were legitimate.").
171. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 1992) ("While
residence may sometimes be a valid reason for a challenge, in this case the prosecutor's
invocation of residence rested on a stereotypical racial reason. As a result, we cannot find
that race was not a factor in his decision."). But see Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1171
(9th Cir. 2005) ("It may be unpersuasive for a prosecutor to use residence without attempting
to tie it to the facts of the case .... To the extent Bishop suggests that the race-neutrality of
an explanation depends on its persuasiveness, it has been effectively overruled by Purkett.").
172. See, e.g., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Since
the district court's determination of whether a peremptory challenge constituted purposeful
discrimination turns on an evaluation of credibility of the prosecutor's explanation, we
should give those findings great deference.").
173. This LEXIS search covered the period from April 30, 1986, to September 13, 2005.
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a Batson challenge was raised but the district court ruling was not affirmed.
In five of these cases, the state trial judge had followed some unorthodox
procedure with respect to peremptory challenges, and in one, the case was
remanded for the prosecutor to give reasons. In the remaining two, the
cases were before the Seventh Circuit on collateral review and there had
been a change in the law (after Holland and Powers). The deference to the
trial judge is not surprising given that the trial judge is called upon to decide
whether the reason is race neutral and not pretextual, and this determination
often depends upon whether the trial judge finds the attorney who exercised
the challenge to be credible. As the Seventh Circuit explained, "The trial
174
judge is clearly in the best position to make that factual determination."
The Seventh Circuit will not disturb such a factual finding unless it is
"completely outlandish" or there is other evidence that indicates its
"falsity." 175
The Seventh Circuit's approach illustrates the difficulty of successfully
pursuing a Batson challenge on appeal. When this difficulty is combined
with the difficulty of succeeding with a Batson challenge at the trial level,
where almost any reason (except a race- or gender-based reason) will
suffice, the Batson challenge becomes exceedingly difficult to establish.
The "crippling" evidentiary burden established in Swain has been replaced
by a different, but no less "crippling," burden with Batson itself.
4. Spurring Judicial Self-Help Measures
The difficulty of establishing a Batson challenge combined with the
harms caused by discriminatory peremptories has led a small number of
judges to take self-help measures with respect to Batson. These efforts
have included a judge who has prohibited peremptories in her own
courtroom1 76 and a judge who has refused to seat a jury unless it is racially
diverse. 177 Although these pockets of resistance have been fairly limited,
they are nonetheless striking. It is rare to see a judge resist a judicial
precedent or practice and it is also rare for a judge to speak outside of
judicial opinions.
Almost a decade ago, Judge Constance Baker Motley, then a senior
federal district court judge in the Southern District of New York and one of
the few African-American women on the federal bench, explained that she
was barring peremptory challenges in her courtroom. Admittedly, she
already had senior status, which meant she heard a limited number of cases,
and her decision to bar peremptories in her courtroom would therefore have
a limited effect. Nevertheless, there are only a few other examples of
judges declaring that they disagreed with Supreme Court precedent and
would take some action to express their disagreement. Judge Motley's ban
174.
175.
176.
177.

Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 178-89.
See infra text accompanying notes 190-96.
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on peremptories is one example; Judge Jack B. Weinstein
and Judge
78
Whitman Knapp's refusal to hear drug cases is another. 1
Judge Motley announced her decision in Minetos v. City University of
New York, 179 a case involving a charge of discrimination based on race and
national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Judge Motley found that the defendants had used their peremptories to
strike two African-American jurors and one Latino juror for discriminatory
reasons and that the plaintiff had used her peremptories to exclude white
men for discriminatory reasons. 180 The defendants explained that they
struck the Latino juror based on his views about speaking English on the
job, and that they struck the African-American woman because she was a
teacher and the African-American man because he was a blue-collar worker
who had never worked in an office. 18 1 The plaintiff explained that she
exercised her peremptories to remove white professional men because they
were pro-management. 182 Judge Motley found that both sides' reasons
masked discriminatory purposes. For Judge Motley, the "case illustrate[d]
the bedevilling problems associated with peremptory challenges which, by
183
their very nature, invite corruption of the judicial process."'
Although neither side requested it, Judge Motley raised the question sua
sponte whether peremptories were constitutional, and held that they were
not. She observed that ten years of Batson had failed to root out
discrimination and Elem was bound to add further complications. 184 In her
opinion, Judge Motley referred to an article by another judge, who had
listed reasons that had been accepted or rejected in Batson challenges in
New York state court opinions, and who had tried to categorize them as
pretextual or non-pretextual. 18 5 Judge Motley saw this as a cry for help
from litigants and judges, but not as an answer because the list also served
as a how-to guide for those who were of a mind to discriminate. The
answer, she wrote, was to eliminate peremptories.
She held that

178. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, 2 Judges Decline Drug Cases, Protesting Sentencing

Rules, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1993, at Al (stating that "[t]wo of New York City's most
prominent Federal judges said yesterday that they would no longer preside over drug cases,
going public with a protest that calls attention to what dozens of Federal judges are doing
quietly across the country," and that "[t]he decisions, by Jack B. Weinstein of Brooklyn and
Whitman Knapp of Manhattan, were made in protest against national drug policies and
Federal sentencing guidelines"); Jack B. Weinstein, Op-Ed., The War on Drugs Is SelfDefeating, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1993, at A19 ("Largely because of mandated and
unnecessarily harsh sentences for minor drug offenders, which fail to deter, I have exercised
my option as a senior Federal judge not to try minor drug cases.").
179. 925 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
180. Id.at 180.
181. Id.at 181-82.
182. Id.at 182.
183. Id.at 183.
184. Id.
185. Id.at 184 (citing Donald P. De Riggi, Appellate Court Guidance On Batson
Challenges, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 1996, at 48).
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peremptories "per se violate equal protection,"' 186 even though the Supreme
Court had never so held. Her explanation was as follows:
It is time to put an end to this charade. We have now had enough
judicial experience with the Batson test to know that it does not truly
unmask racial discrimination. In short, lawyers can easily generate
facially neutral reasons for striking jurors and trial courts are hard pressed
to second-guess
them, rendering Batson and Purkett's protections
187
illusory.
Her opinion, described in the press as an extraordinary ruling, 188 held that
"judicial experience with peremptory challenges proves that they are a
189
cloak for discrimination and, therefore, should be banned."'
In a courtroom in the Midwest, Cook County Circuit Judge Evelyn Clay,
also an African-American woman, announced during jury selection in at
least three criminal trials that she refused to seat all-white juries. In one
jury selection, after eight jurors had been selected, she announced: "'I'm
telling you folks, I don't know what you all intend to do, but I have no
intention of seating an all-white jury."' 190 In another jury selection, after
nine jurors were seated to hear a first-degree murder case, she made a
similar comment. According to press review of the transcript, the judge
explained: "'I should have... given you my rules. I don't seat an all-white
jury."' 19 1 In the third trial, also a murder case, she discussed the issue with
the Assistant State's Attorney. At that point, there were still no AfricanAmericans seated on the jury. The judge explained that she thought allwhite juries denied a defendant a jury of his peers and that the government
needed to be willing to seat qualified African-American jurors as well. The
government eventually accepted an African-American woman as the twelfth
juror. One law professor, when questioned about the judge's remarks,
192
described them as "extraordinary."'
It is unclear whether Judge Clay was acting in response to lawyers'
efforts to use their peremptories to exclude African-Americans and phrased
her concerns in an unfortunate manner or whether she had attempted to
move the law beyond Batson in her own courtroom. Although the Supreme
Court has prohibited race as the basis for a peremptory challenge, it has
never said that the petit jury must mirror the community. Even the
dissenters in Holland 93 agreed that it would be unworkable to insist that
186. Id. at 185.
187. Id.

188. Mark Hansen, Peremptory-Free Zone: A Federal Judge Won't Allow Such
Challengesin Her Courtroom,A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 26.
189. Minetos, 925 F. Supp. at 185.
190. Jeff Coen, Judge Lays Down Own Law: No All-White Juries, Chi. Trib., July 25,
2005, at Al.

191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Ronald Allen, a professor at Northwestern University School of Law).
193. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (holding that a prosecutor's exercise of
peremptory challenges against African-Americans did not violate a white defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury).
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the twelve-person jury be as diverse as the community. 194 At most, the
Court has said that no group can be systematically excluded from the
venire, but not that a defendant is guaranteed a petit jury that looks any
particular way. 195 If Judge Clay truly meant that she would not seat an allwhite jury, she created a rule that is unsupported by current law.
Whether Judge Clay's remarks were borne of frustration, as Judge
Motley's holding seemed to be, or of resistance to the current law and an
effort to remake it, Batson will likely spur judges to move in this direction
in the future. 196 If judges take Batson's goals seriously and want it to
produce nondiscrimination during jury selection, then they are likely to be
frustrated. Their frustration can lead to self-help measures. So far, only a
few judges have taken self-help measures in their courtroom. However, if a
growing number of judges feel frustrated with Batson and express their
frustration through self-help measures, these actions will undermine the
high regard in which courts are generally held. The Supreme Court can
stem this tide by reconsidering whether Batson is performing the tasks it
was designed to do and, if not, the Court should consider the appropriate
next step.
IV. THE NEXT

STEP

The next step, supported by a growing number of judges, is to eliminate
the peremptory challenge. The Supreme Court has recognized that although
the peremptory challenge has long been part of our legal tradition it is not
guaranteed by the Constitution. 197 Whereas equal protection is protected by
194. Id at 498-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The majority's apparent concern that
applying the fair-cross-section requirement to the petit jury would, as a logical matter,
require recognition of a right to a jury that mirrors the population of distinctive groups in the
community is chimerical."); id. at 512 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) ("The fair-cross-section
requirement mandates the use of a neutral selection mechanism to generate a jury
representative of the community. It does not dictate that any particular group or race have
representation on a jury.").
195. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) ("It should also be
emphasized that in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative
of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the
community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population.").
196. Judges and lawyers have observed a similar practice in Wayne County, Michigan.
Chief of the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney's appellate section, Timothy Baughman,
said it was "'not uncommon' for county judges to manipulate jury selection to guarantee at
least minimal minority representation." Brian Dickerson, Rule Is Drafted on Race, Juries,
Det.
Free
Press,
Sept.
29,
2005,
at
1B,
available
at
http://www.freep.com/news/mich/jury29e_20050929.htm ("'There are some judges who
believe that if there is too low a proportion of some racial, ethnic or gender group on the
jury, the judge may deny a proper peremptory challenge in order to protect the jury from
becoming further imbalanced." (quoting Baughman)). Michigan Supreme Court justices are
considering a new rule that would bar judges from "manipulating jury selection to boost the
number of minority jurors." Id.
197. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) ("While the Constitution does
not confer a right to peremptory challenges.... those challenges traditionally have been
viewed as one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury .... The
Court went on to observe, however, that a State may not exercise its challenges in
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the Constitution, the peremptory challenge is not. 198 The elimination of the
peremptory could lead to some other changes during jury selection, 199 such
as an expanded voir dire and an expanded for-cause challenge. However,
even an expanded for-cause challenge is distinct from the peremptory
because it would still require specific reasons and would still remain within
the discretion of the judge.
A. A Small but Growing Dissent
The chorus of judges calling for the elimination of the peremptory, while
still small, is nonetheless growing. One of the early proponents of this
position was Justice Marshall. In his concurrence in Batson, he joined the
Court in overruling the "crippling" evidentiary burden 200 established in
Swain, but wrote separately to express his view that until the peremptory
challenge is eliminated, discrimination would persist during jury
selection. 20 1 He feared that Batson would provide too easy a cover for
lawyers who were inclined to discriminate 20 2 as well as for those who might
be unaware of their true motives. 20 3 Although Batson was only limited to
prosecutors' peremptories, Justice Marshall was willing to eliminate
defendants' peremptories in an effort to eliminate all discrimination during
20 4
jury selection.
Since Justice Marshall's concurrence, a number of trial judges who have
had experience with Batson in their courtrooms have come to share his
view. In the mid-1990s, as mentioned above, Judge Motley observed that
"[t]ime has proven Mr. Justice Marshall correct. '20 5 She went so far as to
hold peremptories to be a per se violation of equal protection and to ban
them in her courtroom. 20 6 Judge Raymond Broderick, 20 7 a senior federal
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause."); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219
(1965) ("Although there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires
the Congress [or the States] to grant peremptory challenges, . . . nonetheless the challenge is
one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused." (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).
198. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 91.
199. Of course, the elimination of the peremptory does not require changes to the forcause challenge. It is simply that one change to the system makes it likely that other slight
adjustments might be needed as well.
200. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
201. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 106 ("Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a
juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons.").
203. Id. ("A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to
the conclusion that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that
would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically.").
204. Id at 107-08 ("We can maintain that balance, not by permitting both prosecutor and
defendant to engage in racial discrimination in jury selection, but by banning the use of
peremptory challenges by prosecutors and by allowing the States to eliminate the
defendant's peremptories as well.").
205. Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 178-89.
207. See Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory ChallengeShould Be Abolished, 65
Temp. L. Rev. 369 (1992).
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district court judge in Pennsylvania, and Judge Morris Hoffman,2 08 a state
court judge in Colorado, came to share Justice Marshall's view. Judge
Gregory Mize, 20 9 a former Superior Court judge in Washington, D.C., also
recommended the elimination of peremptory challenges. Recently, Judge
Arthur Burnett, Sr., a senior judge on the Superior Court of the District of
"peremptory challenges could and should be
Columbia, wrote that
2 10
abolished altogether."
Justice Stevens's Foreword to a symposium issue on the jury in the
Chicago-KentLaw Review suggested that he, too, had come to embrace this
position.2 11 He described the different vantage points from which he had
been able to view the peremptory: as a practicing lawyer who believed the
peremptory to be an inalienable right, and as a judge who had to pore over
voir dire transcripts and observe both the modest benefits of the peremptory
as well as the serious costs it exacted. 2 12 He noted the broader purposes
that the jury serves, including the democratic function of allowing citizens
to participate in their government, and the toll that their exclusion for
impermissible reasons takes on them. Justice Stevens explained that "[a]
citizen should not be denied the opportunity to serve as a juror unless an
impartial judge can state an acceptable reason for the denial. A challenge
for cause provides such a reason; a peremptory challenge does not. '2 13 My
interpretation of these sentences is that Justice Stevens had come to the
view that peremptories should be eliminated and for-cause challenges
preserved. These sentences suggest that the experience of jury duty is too
important to preclude some citizens from serving as jurors for any or no
reason at all, as peremptories do. Rather, if citizens are prevented from
serving it should only be for a legitimate reason, articulated by an impartial
judge that meets the threshold of a for-cause challenge.
Interestingly, when Justice Stephen G. Breyer took up Justice Marshall's
position in a concurrence in Miller-El v. Dretke2 14 Justice Stevens did not
join him. In a later speech Justice Stevens praised Justice Breyer's
concurrence as "thoughtful," 2 15 but he joined only Justice Souter's opinion

208. See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial

Judge's Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809, 810, 850 (1997).
209. See Gregory E. Mize, On Better Jury Selection: Spotting UFO Jurors Before They

Enterthe Jury Room, Ct. Rev., Spring 1999, at 10.
210. Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Abolish Peremptory Challenges: Reform Juries To Promote

Impartiality,Crim. Just., Fall 2005, at 26, 27.
211. See John Paul Stevens, Foreword,78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 907 (2003).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 907-08.
214. 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005); id. at 2340 (Breyer, J., concurring).
215. John Paul Stevens, Address to the American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall
6, 2005),
available at
Abner
Mikva (Aug.
Awards Dinner Honoring
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html.
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for the Court. 2 16 It may
be that Justice Stevens is waiting for the right time,
2 17
as he was in McCray.
In his concurrence in Miller-El, Justice Breyer did not explicitly state that
peremptories should be eliminated, but suggested a reconsideration of
"Batson's test and the peremptory challenge system as a whole. '2 18 He
reached this position only after having shown how difficult it is for parties
to succeed on a Batson challenge and for trial judges to assess the reasons
given for a peremptory. 2 19 All told, the toll on courts is significant:
"[D]espite the strength of his claim, Miller-El's challenge has resulted in 17
years of largely unsuccessful and protracted litigation-including 8
different judicial proceedings and 8 different judicial opinions, and
involving 23 judges, of whom 6 found the Batson standard violated and 16
the contrary. '220 Justice Breyer also noted that the Court's commitment to
nondiscrimination during jury selection has been voiced more strongly in
recent years, yet despite this commitment, discriminatory peremptories
remain pervasive: Articles in bar journals, jury consultant materials, and
jury selection guidebooks continue to advise lawyers on how to make use of
race- and gender-based stereotypes. 22 1 Justice Breyer surmised that the bar
has reached the point where it could envision a jury selection in which the
peremptory played no role.
B. Eliminatingthe PeremptoryandExpanding the For-CauseChallenge
The elimination of the peremptory should be the next step. This would
end the discrimination during jury selection that has persisted under Batson.
Eliminating the peremptory might require a slightly expanded for-cause
challenge, but this should not be reason for concern. As I have written
elsewhere, 222 a slightly expanded for-cause should not create the same
problems as peremptories and should allay some of the concerns of lawyers
and litigants about securing an impartial jury.
The for-cause challenge has several features that distinguish it from the
peremptory. For-cause challenges are decided by the trial judge, unlike the
peremptory, which is exercised by the lawyer. For-cause challenges, unlike
peremptories, are not limited in number and the number is left to the trial
judge's discretion. Any time a trial judge grants a for-cause challenge there
must be a specific reason, unlike with a peremptory where a lawyer only
has to provide a reason if challenged under Batson. Traditionally, a forcause challenge is granted only if the juror has a familial connection to one
216. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2322.
217. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (Stevens, J.) (respecting the denial of the

petitions for writs of certiorari). For a more detailed discussion of McCray, see supra text
accompanying notes 65-74.
218. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2344 (Breyer, J., concurring).
219. Id. at2340-41.
220. Id.
221. Id.at 2342-43.
222. See Marder, supra note 74, at 1107-14.
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of the participants in the trial, a financial stake in the outcome of the case,
or an inability to be impartial.2 23 Trial judges typically exercise restraint in
granting for-cause challenges, though this may be because they know that
lawyers can still use a peremptory to remove the juror even if they deny a
for-cause challenge.
If peremptories were eliminated, the for-cause challenge might have to be
expanded in two ways. First, the trial judge would have to be willing to
grant a greater number of for-cause challenges because the peremptory
would no longer be available to the lawyer as a back-up. Second, the set of
acceptable reasons for granting a for-cause challenge might have to be
expanded. For example, for-cause challenges today are granted if the juror
says he or she cannot be impartial. Without peremptories, for-cause
challenges also might have to be granted if the juror cannot satisfy the
appearance of impartiality due to some individual action he or she has
2 24
taken.
Trial judges would have to develop such an expanded for-cause standard
as they gained experience with it in a jury selection in which there were no
peremptory challenges. The A.B.A. Principles,though not recommending
the elimination of the peremptory challenge, did recommend that "[e]ach
jurisdiction should establish, by law, the grounds for and the standards by
225
which a challenge for cause to a juror is sustained by the court."
Although I think that judges, rather than legislatures, are in the best position
to develop such standards, I think that the A.B.A. Principles provide a
useful starting point for judges:
At a minimum, a challenge for cause to a juror should be sustained if the
juror has an interest in the outcome of the case, may be biased for or
against one of the parties, is not qualified by law to serve on a jury, has a
familial relation to a participant in the trial, or226
may be unable or unwilling
to hear the subject case fairly and impartially.
The A.B.A. Principlesalso provide additional safeguards that should help to
convince lawyers and litigants that the case will be heard by an impartial
jury. The A.B.A. Principles suggest that trial judges base their for-cause
decision on a juror's demeanor and responses and that trial judges make a
record of their reasons, including any factual findings that are
appropriate. 22 7 Finally, the A.B.A. Principlesadvise judges that if "there is

223. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
224. See Marder, supra note 74, at 1109-10 ("[A] juror who is a member of the Ku Klux
Klan may be eliminated for cause in a case involving racial bias because this juror has taken
an individual action that suggests bias.... Her bias is not assumed because of some
immutable characteristic or unchosen status, such as religion, ethnicity, or economic class,
but is imputed to her on the ground that she made an individual choice. Thus, she is still
judged as an individual who has taken a deliberate action.").
225. A.B.A. Principles, supra note 12, Principle 11.C.1.
226. Id. Principle 11.C.2.
227. Id. Principle I1.C.3.
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a reasonable doubt that the juror can be228fair and impartial, then the court
should excuse him or her from the trial.
Allowing only for-cause challenges, with a standard developed by trial
judges over time, would result in an important shift in roles during jury
selection. It would leave to trial judges, rather than to lawyers, the decision
about when to remove a juror. Leaving the decision to an impartial trial
judge, rather than an advocate, seems appropriate in light of the way in
which peremptories frequently mask discrimination. Having for-cause
challenges for which the trial judge provides reasons on the record, rather
than peremptories that often do not require any explanation, should reassure
participants in the courtroom that jurors are only excused for legitimate
reasons that are subject to appellate review. Having the trial judge, rather
than a legislature, develop a standard over time leaves these matters to the
person who is present in the courtroom and who is in the best position to
decide.
In his Foreword,Justice Stevens suggested a willingness to have only an
impartial judge decide whether to remove a juror and only after the judge
has given reasons on the record. 229 Even though Justice Stevens was once a
trial lawyer, he was also an appellate judge. In both roles, he has always
had tremendous respect for trial judges and trusted them to perform their
job properly. Shifting the power only to judges to remove jurors will
benefit jurors who would otherwise have been excluded and will benefit
juries, which will be drawn more broadly from the community without the
skewing effect of discriminatory peremptories. Eliminating the peremptory
will open up the jury and the jury experience to a broader swath of the
community and will help the jury play several of its roles more effectively.
V. A BROAD VIEW OF THE JURY'S ROLES
A jury selection without peremptories will enhance several of the jury's
key roles, including several roles that Justice Stevens has highlighted in his
opinions and other writings. Without peremptories, citizens who would
otherwise have been removed will now be able to serve as jurors and their
recollection of the evidence and testing of assumptions will contribute to
jury fact-finding. Without peremptories, these jurors who would have been
excluded will now benefit from the jury's educational function, in which
the jury serves as a "free school," 230 teaching citizens about the
responsibilities of self-governance in a democracy. Their participation will,
in turn, broaden the range of views and perspectives that are available to the
jury. The jury that is actually seated, drawn from a broader swath of the
community, will more fully represent the commonsense views of the
community. Finally, the jury will become a more effective buffer between
criminal defendants and the government, which was identified in Duncan v.
228. Id.
229. See Stevens, supra note 211, at 907-08.
230. Tocqueville, supra note 83, at 275.
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Louisiana23 1 as the criminal jury's main role, and which is perhaps the
jury's most critical role in death penalty cases.
A. FindingFacts
One of the jury's main functions is to find facts. Indeed, the trial judge
typically instructs the jury that its job is to find the facts and to apply the
law as the judge gives it to the jury to the facts as the jurors find them. 232
Although the line between finding the facts and interpreting the law is not
as clear cut as judges would have jurors believe, 233 finding the facts is one
task that the jurors are clearly supposed to perform.
The jury is well constituted for fulfilling its role as fact finder. Criminal
juries typically consist of twelve jurors. They listen to the testimony and
arguments, scrutinize exhibits, and assess witness credibility to decide what
actually happened. In most courtrooms today, jurors are permitted to take
notes, 234 and in a few courtrooms they are even able to submit written
questions to the judge to be asked of the witnesses. 235 They do not need to
remain passive during the trial. They have been given tools, like taking
notes and asking questions, which should aid them in their fact-finding
function. They also have the benefit of group deliberation to assist them in
their fact-finding. The idea is that twelve jurors will recollect different
pieces of information, offer different interpretations, challenge each other's
assumptions, and correct each other's mistakes so that they can arrive at an
accurate verdict. 236 The jurors can consider each other's competing
interpretations and organizing frameworks 23 7 and decide which ones are the
most compelling and withstand group scrutiny.
Peremptories can impair the fact-finding function of the jury. To the
extent that peremptories limit who can serve, they deprive the jury of
members who would have contributed different ways of interpreting the
231. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
232. A typical instruction to the jury is as follows:
It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts
you will apply the law as I give it to you. You must follow the law as I give it to
you whether you agree with it or not. And you must not be influenced by any
personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices or sympathy. That means that you
must decide the case solely on the evidence before you.
Manual of Modem Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit
Nos. 1.1, 3.1 (2003).
233. See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of
Democracy 64 (1994) ("The fact/law distinction, so starkly posed in judges' instructions to
juries today, is, however, a fiction that seldom corrals the behavior of actual jurors.").
234. See, e.g., Jury Trial Innovations 141 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997)
(describing the practice of juror note taking as "widespread").
235. In a few states, such as Arizona, Florida, and Indiana, juror questions are permitted
by state procedural rules. See Nicole L. Mott, The CurrentDebate on Juror Questions: "To
Ask or Not To Ask, That Is the Question, "78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1099, 1100 (2003).
236. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-44 (1978).
237. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex
Decision Making, 51 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 242 (1986) (finding that jurors organize
trial evidence into a story framework).
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evidence. Discriminatory peremptories exclude members of groups who
can offer different perspectives that might not be shared by other members
of the jury. Peremptories can deprive the jury of jurors who, because of
their outsider status, are willing to question traditional assumptions and
challenge prevailing views. For example, "[m]inority men typically have
had more direct experience with police than have white men, which makes
them 'more willing to believe that police sometimes lie.'" 238 Without such
a mix of jurors, the jury might settle too quickly on its verdict 239 and not
engage in thorough deliberations; this, in turn, can impair the accuracy of
the jury's fact-finding and its verdict.
Justice Stevens has recognized the key role that the jury plays as a fact
finder, and, in two landmark opinions, has sought to protect this role. In
Apprendi v. New Jersey,24 0 an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court
held that a judge could not enhance a sentence beyond the maximum term
of imprisonment provided by statute unless a jury had found the facts upon
which the trial judge was basing the enhancement. Apprendi had pleaded
guilty to two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose and one count of the third-degree offense of unlawful
possession of an antipersonnel bomb, after having been arrested for firing a
gun into an African-American family's home in an all-white
neighborhood. 24 1 The state reserved the right to seek an "enhanced"
sentence on one of the second-degree possession counts on the ground that
it was committed with a biased purpose. 242 Apprendi reserved the right to
challenge the hate crime sentence enhancement as a violation of due
process. 24 3 The enhancement would make a significant difference in the
244
number of years that Apprendi would remain in prison.
Although judges are free to exercise their discretion within the
sentencing range prescribed by a state statute, any facts that justify the
judge imposing a sentence beyond that range must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Stevens explained as follows: "Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. '245 In this case, the trial judge
held an evidentiary hearing and found upon a preponderance of the
evidence that Apprendi had purposely intended to "intimidate" the family

238. Steve Bogira, A Jury of Whose Peers?, Chi. Reader, May 13, 2005, at 1, 26 (quoting
private attorney Melinda Power).
239. See, e.g., Irving L. Janis, Groupthink 7, 270-71 (2d ed. 1983) (labeling as
"groupthink" the situation in which group members conform to the prevalent view and
effectively limit the range of ideas expressed and considered by the group).
240. 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Stevens, J.).
241. Id.at 469.
242. Id. at 470.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 490.
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members because of their race. 246 The Court rejected judicial fact-finding
247
as the basis for imposing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum.
Such a practice marked, in Justice Stevens's words, "an unacceptable
departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our
248
criminal justice system."
In United States v. Booker,2 49 the Court addressed the Apprendi problem
in the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines").
Specifically, the Court considered whether judicial fact-finding under a
preponderance of the evidence standard violated a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial when it resulted in an enhanced sentence
under the Guidelines. The defendants in these cases were convicted of drug
violations, and their sentences were increased based upon findings of the
trial judges under the preponderance of evidence standard as to the quantity
of drugs they possessed. Although one of the trial judges imposed a
sentence based solely on the jury's verdict, the government appealed after
its motion to enhance the sentence was denied.
In Booker, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court as to the applicability of
the Sixth Amendment to the Guidelines, 250 emphasized the important role
that jury fact-finding has traditionally played. He noted that the recent
practice in which judges render enhanced sentences based upon facts that
they, rather than a jury, had found had "increase[d] the judge's power and
diminish[ed] that of the jury." 2 51 Booker sought to restore this shift in
power: "The new sentencing practice forced the Court to address the
question how the right of jury trial could be preserved, in a meaningful way
guaranteeing that the jury would still stand between the individual and the
power of the government under the new sentencing regime." 2 52 Booker
reaffirmed the holding in Apprendi and the primacy of jury fact-finding:
Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a
plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted
by the defendant or
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 53
B. EducatingJurors in the Lessons of Democracy
Writing about his journey to America, Alexis de Tocqueville was struck
by the educational role of the jury, and described the institution as a "free
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 470-7 1.
Id. at 491-92.
Id. at 497.
125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court as to the

incompatibility of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial holding with the mandatory nature of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, thus holding that the Guidelines are advisory rather than
mandatory. See id. at 756.
251. Id. at 751 (Stevens, J.).
252. Id. at 752.
253. Id. at 756.
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school. '254 He was not sure how well the jury performed its judicial
function, but he was quite sure that it provided a rare opportunity, along
with voting, for citizens to participate in and appreciate the importance of
self-governance.
Surprisingly, Tocqueville thought that the experience of serving on a
civil jury exerted a more powerful influence on jurors than the experience
of serving on a criminal jury. 25 5 Tocqueville suggested that jurors would
view their role on a criminal jury as providing a buffer between the
defendant and the government, and that they would be less inclined to
follow the lead of the judge, whom they would view as part of the
government. 256 In contrast, on a civil jury, where cases could be more
complicated, he thought that jurors would take their cues more readily from
the judge and that the judge could teach jurors to think judiciously.2 57 They
would take these lessons with them when they left the courtroom, and they
would apply them in their daily lives,
thus spreading the wisdom of the
258
judge well beyond the particular case.
Although Tocqueville's views on the influence of the judge, particularly
in civil cases, might be overly optimistic, his view of the educational value
of jury duty remains apt. For some, jury service is their first experience
with the legal system. Jury service teaches them about courts, procedures,
and the law. For others, jury duty has particular significance because it is a
badge of full citizenship. Voting and jury service are the two opportunities
for citizens to participate in the democratic process. For women and
African-Americans, who fought for these badges of citizenship, jury service
has added meaning. 259 For all jurors, jury duty provides an opportunity to
see the law in action. The verdict that the jury reaches affects the parties
directly in front of them. The immediacy and importance of the jury's work
is strongly felt by all present in the courtroom.
The Court in Batson,260 Powers,26 1 and the Batson progeny 262 recognized
the important educational role that jury service provides. Justice Stevens
was part of the majority in these cases. The Powers Court relied on
Tocqueville's observations about the jury as a free school 263 that provides a
rare opportunity for citizens to learn about and participate in their
democracy as the basis for the defendant's third-party standing to raise the
254. Tocqueville, supra note 83, at 275.

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 275-76.
258. One of the reasons Tocqueville might have made this point was because he was
trying to convince French judges that a jury system would actually extend their influence and
power, rather than detract from it, in an effort to persuade them to adopt such a system.
259. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877,
888 & n.42, 889 & n.43 (1999) (describing the exclusion of African-American men and all
women from jury duty).
260. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
261. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
262. See supra Part Il.B.
263. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-07.
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excluded juror's claim to serve on the jury and to have this educational
benefit. 264 A juror's education, however, comes with costs. Jurors must
forgo their daily work and other commitments in order to be available to
serve. Justice Stevens recognized that "[u]nnecessary inconveniences,
delays, and costs associated with jury duty make it a burden in many cases"
and that it is "crucial" to "minimize those burdens." 265 There is a need to
treat these citizens, who are performing an important governmental
function, with respect. When they are summoned, they should be permitted
to serve unless there is a legitimate reason to excuse them. With the
elimination of peremptories citizens will be treated with respect. They will
be precluded from serving on a jury only in a limited number of
circumstances and for nondiscriminatory reasons that are germane to the
case.
C. Providingthe Commonsense Judgment of the Community
Another role of the jury is to bring its commonsense judgment to bear in
deciding a case. Jurors cannot, as judges do, draw upon legal knowledge
and training to resolve the case. However, they can make use of their
everyday, commonsense understanding to decide the case.
Jurors view the case with fresh eyes. Their very inexperience with the
legal system provides a contrast to judges who can become "compliant,
biased, or eccentric" 266 over time. In criminal cases, jurors' mere presence
can reassure the defendant that the decision maker in his case has no
particular bias against him and might be better situated to understand the
case from his perspective than the judge, who might seem distanced from
the defendant. 26 7 In civil cases, such as those involving "disputes in the
factory, the warehouse, and the garage," the jury, with its "commonsense
' 268
understanding," is "appropriately invoked.
Because the jury's verdict serves as the judgment of the community, it is
important that the jury is representative of the community. This does not
mean that every petit jury will mirror the community at large. Nor does it
mean that the petit jury must contain a quota of different groups from the
community. 269 The Court has said only that under the Sixth Amendment no
264. Id.at410-15.
265. Stevens, supra note 211, at 908.
266. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
267. Id.("If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.").
268. Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 583 (1990) (Stevens, J.,concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
269. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 512-13 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens explained as follows:
The Constitution does not permit the easy assumption that a community would be
fairly represented by a jury selected by proportional representation of different
races any more than it does that a community would be represented by a jury
composed of quotas of jurors of different classes.... What the Constitution does
require is "a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the
community."
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group should be systematically excluded from the venire. 270 Justice
Stevens, however, has urged a broader view of a jury's representativeness.
In his dissent in Holland, he explained the need for "neutral selection" in
order "to generate a jury representative of the community."'27 1 Although the
Holland Court held that a white defendant did not have a Sixth Amendment
right to object to the exclusion of Afican-American jurors through
peremptory challenges, Justice Stevens focused on the overlap between the
Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments. 272 He argued for an understanding
of the Sixth Amendment that requires that "juries be drawn through fair and
neutral selection procedures from a broad cross section of the community"
and that this "insures a jury that will best reflect the views of the
community-one that is not arbitrarily skewed for or against any particular
273
group or characteristic."
In a system without peremptory challenges, because a broader swath of
the community will be permitted to serve as jurors, juries will be able to
consider a wider range of perspectives and approaches than if the jury came
from a more homogeneous segment of the community. Although Justice
Marshall pointed out that jurors of a particular race or ethnicity do not vote
in a particular way, 274 nevertheless their exclusion from the jury works a
more subtle deprivation: It "deprives the jury of a perspective on human
events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
275
presented."
A jury drawn broadly from the community also will reassure the
community that its verdict was fair. For example, to the extent that
discriminatory peremptories exclude minority members from a jury
minority communities are likely to be suspicious of the verdict. 276 Why
should they accept a verdict when it looked like members of their
277
community were not included in the jury process?

Id. (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)).
270. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975) (holding that the fair-cross-section
requirement was violated by the systematic exclusion of women from the venire).
271. Holland, 493 U.S. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 517 ("The operation of a facially neutral peremptory challenge procedure in a
discriminatory manner is no less a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community than it is a violation of a juror's right
to equal protection.").
273. Id. at 515.
274. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) ("It is not necessary to assume that the
excluded group will consistently vote as a class .....
275. Id. at 503-04.
276. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury
Nullification, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 285, 287-308 (1999) (comparing the ways that the
verdicts in the criminal trials of defendants O.J. Simpson and Stacey Koon and Laurence
Powell were seen by different communities and reported by the press).
277. For one academic's theory about why African-Americans should protest their
treatment in the criminal justice system by engaging in race-based jury nullification, see Paul
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullfication: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105

Yale L.J. 677 (1995).
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D. Serving as a Buffer Between the Government andthe Defendant
At least since Duncan v. Louisiana278 the Court has recognized that a key
role of the jury is to prevent governmental overreaching by serving as a
buffer between the government and a criminal defendant. Indeed, this
function is so central that the Duncan Court described it as "fundamental to
the American scheme of justice" 279 and held that a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial in serious cases was applicable to the states
280
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Duncan Court viewed the jury as a bulwark against governmental
oppression. The jury's role was to provide "an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased or eccentric judge." 28 1 Although times have changed and judges are
no longer appointed because they are loyal to the British Crown, the "[f]ear
of unchecked power" remains as pressing today as it was during the
colonial era, and has led, in Justice Byron R. White's words, to our
"insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or
2 82
innocence."
Justice Stevens has respected this function of the jury and has tried 283
to
safeguard it. For example, when the Court held in Lewis v. United States
that there was no right to a jury trial for a defendant charged with multiple
offenses whose punishment exceeded six months' imprisonment, Justice
Stevens dissented. 2 84 In earlier cases, the Court had used an authorized
punishment of six months in prison as the line demarcating a "serious"
crime from a "petty" one. 28 5 Crimes that were serious received a jury trial;
those that were petty did not. Although this line was not absolute, and
could be moved depending upon accompanying punishments, the Court
used it to determine whether the right to a jury trial attached. In Lewis, the
Court held that there was no right to a jury trial even though the multiple
charges could lead to imprisonment of more than six months for the
defendant. Justice Stevens took the view that a prosecution that exposed
the defendant to a prison term of more than six months, whether for a single
offense or for multiple offenses, "is 286
sufficiently serious to confer on the
defendant the right to demand a jury."
The jury's role as a bulwark against governmental oppression would be
strengthened if peremptories were eliminated. Although the peremptory
has long been seen as a protection for the defendant, a diverse jury actually
278. 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (White, J.).
279. Id.at 149, 153 (describing "the right to jury trial in criminal cases" as "fundamental
to our system of justice").
280. Id.at 156.
281. Id.
282. Id.

283. 518 U.S. 322 (1996).
284. Id.at 339.
285. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (plurality opinion).

286. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 339.
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provides defendants with better protection against governmental
overreaching. If a jury is actually drawn from citizens from all walks of
life, and is not skewed through the exercise of discriminatory peremptories,
that jury is more likely to include a mix of jurors with different vantage
points, including some who are skeptical of the government's case as well
as some who are not. Such a mix of jurors, viewing the case from different
vantage points, will have to engage in thorough and well-considered
deliberation. The verdict in criminal cases in federal court 2 87 and in many
state courts 2 88 must be unanimous. Only after one group has convinced the
other through robust deliberation is a verdict likely to be reached. If a
verdict is not reached, the resulting hung jury is a further protection against
governmental overreaching. Professor Hans Zeisel observed that the hung
jury represents "the legal system's respect for the minority viewpoint that is
held strongly enough to thwart the will of the majority," but can only be
tolerated in moderation: "[T]oo many hung juries would impede the
'2 89
effective functioning of the courts.
Thus, a diverse jury affords the best protection to a defendant that the
government's case will be carefully and critically examined. If all of the
jurors, no matter how varied their perspectives are to begin with, can agree
on a verdict, the verdict is likely to be one that will reassure the defendant
and the communities outside the courtroom that the process was fair and
free of governmental overreaching.
E. GuardingAgainst Governmental Overreachingin Death Penalty Cases
Nowhere is the jury's function of protecting the defendant from
governmental overreaching more critical than in death penalty cases. When
the life or death of the defendant is at stake the jury must display the utmost
vigilance.
Through discriminatory peremptories, many prosecutors have long
sought to stack the jury in their favor in death penalty cases. Traditionally,
they have used peremptories to remove African-Americans and members of
other minority groups. They assumed that these citizens would be more
critical of the government and its case because they have been treated less
well by police and other governmental actors than those in the majority.
This prosecutorial propensity has received coverage in newspapers, 2 90
287. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 48 ("Unless the parties otherwise stipulate, the verdict shall be
unanimous .. "); Fed. R. Crim. P. 3 1(a) ("The verdict must be unanimous.").
288. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 276, at 319 n.160.
289. Hans Zeisel,. . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the FederalJury,

38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 719 n.42 (1971).
290. See, e.g., Steve McGonigle & Ed Timms, Race Bias Pervades Jury Selection:
Prosecutors Routinely Bar Blacks, Study Finds, Dallas Morning News, Mar. 9, 1986,
available at http://www.dallasnews.com/cgi-bin/bi/goldprint.cgi (reporting that the
newspaper's eight-month investigation showed that prosecutors "routinely manipulate the
racial composition of juries through their use of peremptory challenges"). According to
Arch McColl, President of the Dallas County Criminal Bar Association, "prosecutors adhere
to jury selection guidelines suggested in a controversial 1969 paper... by then-Assistant
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cases, 29 1 and guidelines for new prosecutors. 2 92 The practice has become
especially pronounced in capital cases, perhaps because so much is at stake
and many peremptories are available to each side. One of the most blatant
examples appears in a videotape of former Assistant District Attorney Jack
McMahon in the course of providing training on jury selection to other
prosecutors in the District Attorney's Office in Pennsylvania. His advice is
as follows:
And that is-and; let's face it, again, there's the blacks from the lowincome areas are less likely to convict. It's just-I understand it. It's [an]
understandable proposition. There is a resentment for law enforcement,
there's a resentment for authority, and, as a result, you don't want those
people on your jury. And it may appear as if you're being racist or
whatnot, but,
again, you are just being realistic. You're just trying to win
2 93
the case.
As to Batson, he instructed young prosecutors "to be aware of this case":
[T]he best way to avoid any problems with [Batson] is to protect yourself.
And my advice would be in that situation is when you do have a black
jury, you question them at length. And on this little sheet that you have,
mark something down that you can articulate [at a] later time if something
happens, because if they-because the way the case is stated, that it's
only after a prima facie showing that you're doing this that it becomesthat the trial judge can then order you to then start showing why you're
striking them not on racial basis.
So if-let's say you strike three blacks to start with, the first three
people. And then it's like the defense attorney makes an objection saying
that you're striking blacks. Well, you're not going to be able to go back
and say, oh-and make something up about why you did it. Write it
down right then and there.
...So sometimes under that line you may want to ask more questions
of those people so it gives you more ammunition to make an articulable
reason as to why you are striking them, not for race. So that's how to
294
pick a jury.

District Attorney Jon Sparling" who "noted that minorities 'almost always empathize with
the accused' and therefore do not make good jurors for the prosecution." Id.
291. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2332-33 (2005) (citing Dallas
prosecutors' practices); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) (same).
292. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 655-56 (providing quotations from former
Pennsylvania Assistant District Attorney Jack McMahon's training videotape in which he
"repeatedly advises his audience to use peremptory strikes to keep certain categories of
African-Americans from serving on criminal juries, in apparent violation of Batson");
Patrick Mattimore, Reality Check: Attorneys Do Have Juror Biases, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 11,
2005, at 6 (describing former Alameda County, California Deputy District Attorney Jack
Quatman's seminar in which he "encouraged hundreds of prosecutors never to allow Jews on
capital juries").
293. Wilson, 426 F.3d at 657.
294. Id.at 658.

2006]

THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

1727

With the elimination of peremptories, prosecutors and defendants would no
longer have recourse to this practice.
Even without discriminatory peremptories, there are several ways in
which a capital jury is not representative of the community at large. Jurors
who sit on capital cases have to be "death-qualified. '29 5 This means that
the juror has to be willing to consider a sentence of death. Those jurors
who are unalterably opposed to the death penalty and who would never vote
for a sentence of death are removed from the venire through a for-cause
challenge. Only those jurors who support the death penalty or who are at
least willing to consider it are deemed "death-qualified" and permitted to
serve. 296 Empirical studies show that this practice tends to have a disparate
impact on women 297 and African-Americans. 29 8 They are more likely to be
opposed to the death penalty, and therefore, to be removed from such juries.
are more "convictionDeath qualification also tends to seat jurors who 299
prone" than those jurors who are not death-qualified.
In a recent speech, Justice Stevens noted that this process of death
qualification "creates a risk that a fair cross-section of the community will
not be represented on the [capital] jury." 300 He was also concerned that the
extensive voir dire questioning about a juror's willingness to impose the
death penalty can lead jurors to believe that they must impose the death
penalty. 30 1 Several empirical studies30 2 and recent cases 30 3 have suggested
295. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167-69 (1986) (holding that "'death
qualification,' or the removal for cause of the so-called 'Witherspoon-excludable'
prospective jurors" from the guilt phase does not violate the fair-cross-section requirement of
the Sixth Amendment); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968) (holding that the
State's exclusion of prospective jurors who were not just unalterably opposed to the death
penalty, but who simply "expressed conscientious or religious scruples against capital
punishment and all who opposed it in principle" violated the requirements of an impartial
jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments).
296. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521-22 ("Specifically, we hold that a sentence of death
cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding
venireman for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or
expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.").
297. See, e.g., Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors'
PredispositionTo Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation,8 Law & Hum. Behav. 53, 67
(1984) (finding that potential jurors excluded from death-qualified juries are more likely to
be women).
298. See, e.g., Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control:
Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 Law & Hum. Behav. 31, 46 (1984) (finding that
death-qualified juries are more likely to exclude women and African-American men).
299. See, e.g., Cowan et al., supra note 297, at 53.
300. Stevens, supra note 215.
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror
Instructionsin Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1993) (describing their empirical study
in which they found that capital case jurors in South Carolina did not understand the
alternatives to a death sentence and that their confusion led them to favor a sentence of
death); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A
PreliminaryStudy of California'sCapital Penalty Instructions,8 Law & Hum. Behav. 411,
424 (1994) (finding that mock jurors in California had difficulty defining aggravating and
mitigating factors, particularly mitigating factors); Scott Burgins, Jurors Ignore,
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that jurors in capital cases have trouble understanding some of the
instructions. If information that they need to perform their task is withheld
from them, 30 4 or if the legal terms that are used are unclear to them, 30 5 they
will not be able to rely on the judge's instructions for direction and may
succumb to the pressures they feel-from the gruesomeness of the facts to
the victim impact statements 3 06 -to vote for the death penalty.
The process of death qualification would not be necessary if two separate
juries heard the two distinctive phases-guilt and sentencing-in a capital
case. If the jury deciding guilt was not the same as the jury deciding the
sentence, then the jury deciding guilt would not need to be death-qualified
because it would not be participating in the sentencing phase. 30 7 Instead, in
states with the death penalty where the jury decides or recommends a
sentence, one jury participates in both phases and often proceeds from
reaching a guilty verdict to the sentencing phase without a significant break.
This compressed schedule puts added pressure on a jury, which might
already be emotionally drained from the guilt phase. In addition, by using
the same jury for both phases, there is pressure on the sentencing jury30to
8
justify the verdict of guilt it has reached by choosing a sentence of death.
If death qualification already limits how representative the jury in a
capital case can be, as Justice Stevens has suggested, then discriminatory
MisunderstandInstructions, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at 30 (describing a study by the Capital
Jury Project, which found that jurors in seven states do not understand how to weigh
aggravating and mitigating circumstances); Arthur S. Hayes, Jurors' Grasp of Instructions
May Stir Appeal, Wall St. J., July 16, 1992, at B 1 (describing an empirical study undertaken
by Professor Hans Zeisel, who tested mock jurors' comprehension of Illinois pattern
instructions used in capital cases and found that mock jurors did not understand the
definition of mitigating circumstances and that the prosecutor had the burden of proof in
seeking a sentence of death).
303. See, e.g., Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51 (2001) (holding that the jury
must be told that life imprisonment means life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (holding that where a capital
defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the sentencing alternatives for the jury are
death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the jury must be told that the
defendant is ineligible for parole).
304. See supra note 303 (describing Shafer and Simmons in which information was
withheld from the jury).
305. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 778 F.
Supp. 431, 434-35 (N.D. I11. 1991) (acknowledging that Zeisel's study pointed to
deficiencies in the instructions actually used in Free's trial especially in terms of explaining
mitigating factors and how they are to be used by jurors). But see Free, 12 F.3d at 706
(Posner, C.J.) (rejecting Zeisel's study because it failed to replicate how a jury actually
worked).
306. Stevens, supra note 215.
307. But see United States v. Green, 407 F.3d 434, 437 (1st Cir. 2005) (vacating the
district court's order to select two distinct juries, "one (non-death-qualified) to hear the guilt
phase and the other (death-qualified) to hear the penalty phase," as violative of the Federal
Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (2000)).
308. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, A Life and Death Decision: A Jury Weighs the Death
Penalty 34 (2005) (describing several jurors in one capital case who once they had "decided
that [defendant] was guilty, they also had started to become personally and emotionally
invested in the prosecution's view of [defendant] and his crime").
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peremptories exacerbate the situation by further compromising the
representativeness of the jury. Representativeness is important so that the
jurors will regard the evidence with a critical eye and so that the verdict is
accepted beyond the courtroom. If a jury drawn from a broad swath of the
community is the most effective safeguard against government
overreaching, then the capital jury, which confronts government
overreaching when the consequences are most severe, is the least
effectively constituted to play this role.
CONCLUSION

In his thirty years on the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens has been a
staunch supporter of the jury system. He has long recognized the harms
produced by discriminatory peremptories, as well as the benefits of
peremptories when they are properly used. He was part of the majority in
Batson, which sought a delicate balance that would both preserve
peremptories and eliminate discrimination during jury selection. He joined
in all of the Batson progeny that extended the reach of Batson to eliminate
discriminatory peremptories in civil as well as in criminal cases and when
exercised by the prosecutor as well as by the defense. When the Court
began to stray from Batson and to undermine its effectiveness, Justice
Stevens, in an eloquent dissent, reminded the Court of its commitment to
nondiscrimination during jury selection.
As long as Batson governs, my hope is that Justice Stevens will continue
to defend it and to extend its reach. But my other hope is that Justice
Stevens will join some of the other judges who have voiced their opposition
to the peremptory and proposed its elimination. If the jury is to perform its
many and varied roles, then the peremptory needs to be eliminated so that
discrimination during jury selection can be avoided. The jury has vital
functions to perform as fact finder, educator, and buffer. Any practice, no
matter how longstanding, that interferes with these roles should be rejected.

Notes & Observations

